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TO E-COMMERCE TAX CHALLENGES
ARTHUR J. COCKFIELD*
ABSTRACT
This paper assesses national and international responses to
tax challenges presented by cross-border electronic
commerce. Ten years after these challenges were first
identified, a survey of national government reactions shows
that many countries have not passed any significant tax
legislation or administrative guidance with respect to the
taxation of global e-commerce. This lack of action at the
national level can be explained in large part by the
leadership role taken by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in developing the
guiding principles and, subsequently, the tax rules to
confront the e-commerce tax challenges. The OECD's
general success with e-commerce tax reform demonstrates
the OECD's ability to act as a kind of informal (lower case)
world tax organization, which emphasizes deliberation,
consensus-building and the use of non-binding mechanisms
such as the OECD model tax treaty. Moreover, the OECD's
success suggests that calls for a more formal (upper-case)
World Tax Organization, which could impose binding tax
rules on participating nations, may be misplaced
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning with a 1996 U.S. Treasury Department discussion paper,
national tax authorities issued reports that queried whether international e-
commerce developments would lead to revenue losses or other adverse
outcomes such as an increased use of tax havens for tax evasion or tax
avoidance purposes.' Tax observers similarly scrutinized whether
traditional tax laws and principles would need to be reformed to take into
account the new commercial environment. 2  All of the sound and fury,
however, has led to very little action at the national level.3
This paper surveys steps taken by governments to address these
challenges and shows that, as of December 2005, many governments have
not yet passed any significant laws or administrative guidance with respect
I See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, SELECTED TAX POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 7.2.3.1 (1996) [hereinafter Treasury
Report] (discussing the difficulties in taxing commercial activity that takes place on the
Internet); see also AUSTRALIAN TAX OFFICE, TAX AND THE INTERNET: DISCUSSION
REPORT OF THE AUSTRALIAN TAX OFFICE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE PROJECT (Aug. 1997);
MINISTER'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
AND CANADA'S TAX ADMINISTRATION 2.4.3.3. (April 1998); INLAND REVENUE AND HM
CUSTOMS AND EXCISE, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: UK TAXATION POLICY 10 (Oct. 1998).
See generally Arthur J. Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of
Electronic Commerce Business Profits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 133, 167-212 (1999) (discussing
policy challenges described within government reports along with reform options).
2 See, e.g., David R. Tillinghast, The Impact of the Internet on the Taxation of International
Transactions, 50 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOC. 524, 525 (1996) (warning that e-commerce
developments could lead to tax revenue losses for developing countries); Charles E.
McLure Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological
Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269, 313 (1997) (noting the need for radical
reform in some circumstances); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 532-541 (1997) (proposing a refundable
withholding tax for certain e-commerce transactions); Richard L. Doemberg, Electronic
Commerce and International Tax Sharing, 16 TAX NOTES INT'L 1013 (1998) (discussing
reform alternatives in light of e-commerce challenges). The literature on international e-
commerce taxation is now extensive and this article does not purport to offer a
comprehensive examination of these writings.
3 Earlier discussions similarly found few legal changes in response to international e-
commerce challenges. A recent review of four countries Canada, the United States,
Japan, Hong Kong and China did not reveal any new laws or administrative guidance that
resulted from e-commerce taxation concerns. See JINYAN LI, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2003); see also
RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, LUC HINNEKENS, WALTER HELLERSTEIN, & JINYAN LI,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL TAXATION (The Hague, 2001);
INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOC., TAXATION OF INCOME DERIVED FROM ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE 60 (2001) [ hereinafter IFA Report] ("The overwhelming impression from the
national reports is that in all jurisdictions, taxpayers and tax administrators are still in the
very early stages of addressing these issues.").
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to the taxation of international e-commerce. 4  The lack of action at the
national level was influenced by the lead role undertaken by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in
establishing the guiding principles and tax rules to govern the tax treatment
of international e-commerce transactions. By acting for the first time as a
kind of informal (lower case) world tax organization through the promotion
of unprecedented international tax cooperation, the OECD effectively
addressed international tax policy concerns. 5  The OECD's success also
offers support for the view within the international tax literature that prefers
multilateral tax cooperation and coordination over more formal processes
such as the use of binding international agreements to harmonize tax bases
and/or rates.
Part I discusses the e-commerce reform efforts undertaken by the
OECD that resulted in changes or proposed changes to the OECD model tax
treaty, including steps to amend provisions concerning: (a) the
characterization of income; (b) permanent establishments; (c) corporate
residence; (d) 'group' permanent establishments; and (e) cross-border
service income. Moreover, the Part discusses unprecedented efforts by the
OECD to promote consensus among the international tax community for
Value-Added Tax reform efforts. Part I surveys national legislative,
administrative and judicial action taken to confront international e-
commerce tax challenges and reveals that governments have for the most
part approached reform efforts with caution, often issuing pronouncements
that refer back to the OECD reform efforts. The Part concludes by
reviewing possible explanations, apart from OECD influence, for the lack
of action at the national level.
Part III discusses lessons provided by the OECD's e-commerce tax
reform process and outcome. First, this process provided an unprecedented
level of tax cooperation among OECD members states, non-member
countries and industry representatives: the enhanced cooperation likely
encouraged 'buy in' and broad acceptance of principles and rules,
encouraging tax certainty and reducing the likelihood that e-commerce
4 The research methodology involved a literature review, database searches and discussions
with analysts working or researching in the area of international e-commerce taxation.
5 Other global institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund have shaped international tax rules, but the
OECD is generally recognized as the most influential international organization with
respect to international income tax developments. The OECD's model tax treaty, first
published in 1963, is used by both OECD and non-OECD countries for the negotiation,
application and interpretation of bilateral tax treaties that coordinate national income tax
regimes. For a discussion of the history of the OECD and its predecessor organizations,
see Li, supra note 3, at 37-47, 46 (discussing the impact of the OECD model tax treaty with
member and non-member countries); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The
"Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1066 (1997) (noting
that the OECD model tax treaty is a "direct descendant" of the League of Nations model
treaty developed in the mid-1920s).
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transactions will lead to disputes among national tax authorities or
international double taxation. Second, the OECD's success with e-
commerce tax reform shows that calls for a formal (upper case) World Tax
Organizations, which could impose binding tax rules on participating
nations, may be misplaced. In particular, the OECD e-commerce reform
process overcame hurdles presented by theoretical uncertainty surrounding
appropriate principles to guide international tax policy as well as the desire
by governments to maintain as much tax sovereignty as possible. The Part
concludes by discussing how the OECD could be further legitimized as a
truly world tax organization by strengthening ties with non-member
countries to provide these countries with more opportunities to deliberate
international tax reform efforts.
I. OECD E-COMMERCE REFORM PROCESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW
TAx RULES
A. PROCESS
The OECD is a Paris-based international organization that serves as
an outlet for reform efforts in a number of policy areas, including
international taxation, for its thirty member countries. The Committee on
Fiscal Affairs is the main OECD body that drives international tax reform
efforts, including revisions to the OECD model tax treaty.6 In 1997, the
OECD members first discussed cross-border e-commerce tax challenges at
a meeting held in Turku, Finland and issued a brief report setting out an
agenda to confront these challenges. 7  In October 1998, an OECD
ministerial meeting on global e-commerce was held in Ottawa, Canada,
where the members reached agreement on two important documents
relating to the taxation of international e-commerce. First, the Committee
on Fiscal Affairs endorsed a set of principles that would guide the OECD in
its reform efforts with respect to the taxation of international e-commerce.
Importantly, the so-called Ottawa Taxation Framework noted that
traditional international tax principles should be applied to the new
commercial environment promoted by the Internet and the increased sale of
digital goods and services. 8 Moreover,
6 See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON
CAPITAL (Paris, OECD, 2000) (hereinafter OECD MODEL TAX TREATY).
7 See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: THE CHALLENGES TO
TAX AUTHORITIES AND TAXPAYERS (1997) [hereinafter OECD TURKU REPORT] (prepared
by Robert N. Mattson). For review of the OECD reform work see ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTTAWA TAXATION FRAMEWORK
CONDITIONS: THE 2003 REPORT (2003) [hereinafter OECD IMPLEMENTATION REPORT].
8 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE ON
FISCAL AFFAIRS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: TAXATION FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS (1998)
[hereinafter OTTAWA TAXATION FRAMEWORK].
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[the] approach does not preclude new administrative or legislative
measures, or changes to existing measures, relating to electronic
commerce, provided that those measures are intended to assist in the
application of the existing taxation principles.... [A]ny adaptation of
existing international taxation principles should be structured to
maintain the fiscal sovereignty of countries, to achieve a fair sharing of
the tax base . . . and to avoid double taxation and unintentional non
taxation. 9
Other guiding principles include the need for: maintaining neutral tax
treatment between e-commerce and traditional commerce, low compliance
costs for taxpayers and low administrative costs for tax authorities, clear
and simple tax rules to promote business certainty, reducing the risk of tax
evasion and tax avoidance, and flexibility to keep pace with technological
and commercial developments.
Second, the OECD members and industry representatives signed
onto a lesser-known document that similarly advocated the use of
traditional international tax principles in the formulation of any new rules
for the taxation of e-commerce.10 These two documents were an important
step toward developing consensus on international tax principles and could
prove to be useful beyond e-commerce purposes as the principles could be
reformulated for guidance with respect to future international tax
challenges.
After this meeting, Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs) comprised
of government and industry representatives were formed by the OECD to
promote discussion and analysis.1' In addition, the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs directed its Working Parties to discuss and propose solutions with
respect to discrete areas of policy concern (e.g., Working Party No. 1
reviewed whether the permanent establishment category within the OECD
model tax treaty needed to be amended to take into consideration e-
commerce developments). These fora provided the OECD members (and
non-member countries in certain cases) with an opportunity to voice their
concerns and to reach consensus on the types of reform that would be
acceptable to move the reform process forward.
9Id. at 3.
10 See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Joint Declaration of Business and Government
Representatives: Government/Business Dialogue on Taxation and Electronic Commerce
(Oct. 7, 1998), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/60/1932547.pdf.
" With respect to e-commerce tax reform efforts, the OECD set up the following Technical
Advisory Groups: (1) Technology TAG (to monitor and evaluate Internet technology
developments); (2) Consumption Tax TAG (to examine collection systems for digital
transactions); (3) Professional Data Assessment TAG (to examine how tax professionals
and tax administrations are using information technologies); (4) Business Profits TAG (to
examine how current treaty rules should apply for cross-border e-commerce profits); and
(5) Treaty Characterization TAG (to examine cross-border characterization issues). See
OECD IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
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B. MODEL TREATY CHANGES
The most important OECD reform efforts have or will become
entrenched in the OECD model tax treaty or its Commentary, which is used
to assist with interpreting the treaty provisions. The model treaty and/or the
Commentary are important because they are often recognized by courts as
secondary sources of authority to assist with treaty interpretation. 12  In
addition, many countries-both OECD and non-OECD member states-
base their own bilateral tax treaties on the OECD model tax treaty (the
United States employs its own model tax treaty, but this treaty largely tracks
the provisions within the OECD model). 13 OECD member states are
presented with an opportunity to deliberate these treaty changes, reach
consensus and, if needed, insert observations or reservations within the
Commentary to the OECD model tax treaty when an individual country
does not agree with proposed changes. The importance of the model tax
treaty is underscored by a recent review of the way that governments and
their courts interpret the model tax treaty's permanent establishment
concept for domestic tax purposes: 33 of the 37 countries scrutinized
generally followed the OECD model tax treaty in this area.14
12 See, e.g., Nat'l Westminster Bank, P.L.C. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 498 (U.S.
Ct. Fed. Claims, 2003) ("[b]oth this court and others have recognized that the [OECD tax
treaty and its Commentary] serve as a meaningful guide in interpreting treaties that are
based on its provisions."); Att'y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.,
268 F.3d 103, 119 n.15 (2d Cir., 2001) cert. denied: 2002 U.S.LEXIS 8081 (Nov. 4, 2002)
("[iln the realm of international taxation, the OECD's model convention 'has almost
acquired the status of a multilateral instrument' because of the reliance placed on it by
many countries in negotiating bilateral tax conventions. . . .") citing AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 11: UNITED
STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 3 (1992); The Queen v. Crown Forest Industries, 2 S.C.R.
802, #55, at 827 (Sup. Ct. of Can.1995) (indicating that the OECD model tax treaty is of
"high persuasive value" in defining the parameters of the U.S.-Canada tax treaty).
13 See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Tax Treaty, 26 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1641, 1641 (2001) (asserting that "virtually all" of the over 1,500 bilateral tax
treaties throughout the world are based on the OECD model and thus exhibit significant
uniformity in terms of their provisions); DANIEL SANDLER, TAX TREATIES AND
CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION 2 (2d ed. 1998).
14 The review included non-OECD member states such as Thailand, Malaysia and
Argentina, which at times follow both the OECD model tax treaty and the United Nations
model tax treaty. See Todd M. Landau et al., How to Minimize Global PE Risk,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REVIEW 1 (June 2002), available at
http://www.legalmediagroup.com/intemationaltaxreview/default.asp [hereinafter Global PE
Risk] ("[t]his general acceptance of the OECD Model Treaty provides a valuable frame of
reference for addressing particular problems when they arise in particular jurisdictions.
General acceptance of the conceptual principles articulated by the OECD does not
necessarily mean that local tax authorities or local court will always reach similar
conclusions when interpreting the PE wording of a treaty that follows the language of the
OECD model. In practice, interpretations that rely on what is invariably a fact-intensive
analysis will still frequently differ from country to country.").
SPRING 2006
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The following sections discuss several OECD reform efforts relating
to e-commerce that have led (or may lead, in the case of proposals) to
changes to the OECD model tax treaty or its Commentary.
1. Income Characterization
Tax rules under domestic laws as well as treaties impose different
tax treatment on different types of cross-border income. For example,
business profits are generally sourced to the country where the income-
producing business is based and taxed on a net basis. Royalty income, on
the other hand, is generally sourced to the country where the intellectual
property was used (e.g., the country where the consumer of the intellectual
property is resident) and may be subject to gross withholding taxes.
The digital world raises a number of problems with respect to
income characterization issues. Cross-border transactions involving the
transmission of digital goods or services often make it difficult to determine
whether a transfer of a product has occurred, whether services have been
performed, or whether an intangible product has been licensed. The
problem is that transactions involving digital goods and services often blur
the lines among different categories of income.
As a result of these difficulties, the OECD promoted reform efforts
to guide national tax authorities with respect to the tax treaty
characterization of income produced by the sale of e-commerce goods and
services. For e-commerce transactions involving software, the OECD
amended its Commentary to the OECD model tax treaty to distinguish
between the underlying copyright in the program and software which
incorporates a copy of the copyrighted program. 15 The Commentary now
makes it clear that e-commerce transfers of all digital products should
attract the same treatment as software payments, 16 and that the
technological method of transfer (whether a purchase of a program on a disk
or an e-commerce online transfer) is not relevant.
17
A report sponsored by the OECD looked to twenty-eight categories
involving potential e-commerce transactions to assist tax authorities and
taxpayers in determining the appropriate income characterization for
international e-commerce transactions. 18  The findings of the report were
subsequently adopted into the Commentary of the OECD model tax treaty.
Generally speaking, the cross-border transmission of digital goods and
services will result in the generation of business profits because "the
15 See OECD MODEL TAX TREATY, supra note 6, C(12) 12.2 at C(12)-5.
16 See OECD MODEL TAX TREATY, id. C(12) 17, at C(12)-8.
17 See OECD MODEL TAX TREATY, id. C(12) 14.1, at C(12)-7.
18 Technical Advisory Group on Treaty Characterization of Electronic Commerce
Payments, Tax Treaty Characterization Issues Arising from E-Commerce (Org. Econ. Co-
Operation & Dev., Fe. 1, 2001), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/34/1923396.pdf
(hereinafter "OECD E-commerce Characterization Report).
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payment is essentially for the acquisition of data transmitted in the form of a
digital signal and therefore does not constitute royalties." 19  Royalties,
however, may result when digital goods are downloaded to commercially
exploit the copyright relating to the digital goods.20 The new rules strive to
treat substantively similar economic activity the same way. For example,
the cross-border shipment of a music CD to a foreign consumer or the
Internet transmission of an MP3 file (a compressed digital music file) to
another foreign consumer will both be taxed as business profits and not as
royalty income under the new OECD rules.
2. Server/Permanent Establishments
Due to the advent of the Internet, cross-border commercial
transactions can be enabled by computer servers (i.e., a computer that has
been networked to the Internet) instead of traditional business
intermediaries such as retail stores. For example, a consumer can now
download digital music from a commercial web site whereas these
consumers would normally have purchased this music in the form of a CD
at a retail outlet prior to the rise of the Internet and digital goods. This
development led to the view that the tax treaty definition of permanent
establishment, which is typically defined as a "fixed place of business
through which business is conducted," should be extended to these
computer servers (hereinafter "servers").
As a result, the Commentary now indicates that a server will
constitute a permanent establishment (a "server/PE") if: (1) the server
performs integral aspects of a cross-border transactions; 21 (2) the server is
owned or leased by the non-resident firm; 2 2 and (3) the server is fixed in a
location for a sufficient period of time.23  The Commentary offers an
example of a server/PE that performs functions including "the conclusion of
the contract with the customer, the processing of the payment and the
delivery of the product," but notes that many countries would assert that a
server/PE has been created even if only some of the functions described are
performed via the server.24 The new rules indicate that it is not necessary to
have any human involvement with the server, which can be accessed and
25maintained from a remote location, to create a server/PE. In contrast, the
19 See OECD MODEL TAX TREATY, supra note 6, C(1 2) 17.3, at C(12)-8.
20 See OECD MODEL TAX TREATY, id. C(12) 17.4, at C(12)-8.
21 See OECD MODEL TAX TREATY, id, C(5) 42.8, at C(5) -
22 See OECD MODEL TAX TREATY, id, C(5) 42.8, at C(5) - . As a result, an e-commerce
firm that enters into a hosting arrangement to lease space on a foreign server will reduce
the likelihood that the foreign jurisdiction will assert that the server constitutes a permanent
establishment.
23 See Commentary on Article 5 at par. 42.4.
24 See Commentary on Article 5 at par. 42.6.
25 See Commentary on Article 5 at par. 42.6.
SPRING 2006
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view that a web site, in and of itself, could constitute a permanent
establishment has been rejected. Finally, the Commentary indicates that
non-residents that use foreign-based servers maintained by Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) will generally not constitute permanent establishments as
the non-residents would not typically exert control over the ISPs.
26
As subsequently discussed in Part II.A., the responses by national
tax authorities to the server/PE issue form a continuum of approaches: some
tax authorities maintain that servers should never constitute permanent
establishments, others agree with the OECD position, and finally certain
countries take the view that web sites in and of themselves can constitute
permanent establishments. Problems with the new server/PE rule in the
OECD model tax treaty are discussed in Part III.A.3.
3. Changes to the Place of Effective Management Concept
The United Sates and many other countries enact tax the world-wide
income of their residents (so-called residence-based taxation). In the
context of taxing e-commerce earnings, a residence-based system raises a
number of concerns. 27  Under the 'place-of-incorporation' test, a
corporation is considered a resident in the country where it has been
incorporated while corporations incorporated outside of the country are
considered to be non-residents. Moreover, the place-of-incorporation test
does not require a business to maintain an economic presence within the
country: the simple act of filing articles of incorporation will suffice to
fulfill the residency requirement. As such, residency can change by simply
changing the country of incorporation. In recent years, there has reportedly
been a rise in the number of Internet businesses that have chosen to
incorporate their companies in tax haven jurisdictions.28 Incorporating an
online company in a tax haven may be motivated by tax reasons, but may
also be influenced by permissive laws with respect to commercial activities
such as gambling or pornography.29
26 See Commentary on Article 5 at par. 42.10.
27 For discussion, see generally OECD TAG ON MONITORING THE APPLICATION OF
EXISTING TREATY NORMS FOR THE TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS, THE IMPACT OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE "PLACE OF EFFECTIVE
MANAGEMENT" AS A TIE BREAKER RULE (Discussion Draft) (2001).
28 Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules attempt to prevent parent companies from
deferring taxation on certain forms of income that is generated by foreign affiliates, often
based in tax havens, by taxing this income on a current basis. In some cases, e-commerce
transactions challenge the efficacy of CFC rules. For discussion, see OFFICE OF TAX
POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH
U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY 75-81 (Dec. 2000).
29 For example, Costa Rica is home to the world's largest online gambling company, World
Sports International. In its FAQ, the company answers the question "Do I have to pay taxes
on my winnings? With the following: "Paying taxes on your winnings depends upon the
jurisdiction in which you reside. World Sports International does not provide details of
10
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Countries also employ a 'place of central management and control'
test to determine whether or not a company is a resident.30  This test
generally involves looking to where a company's head office is located or
where the board of directors meets on a regular basis. Traditionally,
directors had to hold face-to-face meetings to make business decisions.
Internet technologies that promote video conferencing and email exchanges
may pose a challenge to the place of central management and control test.
The need for a physical head office may be eliminated as senior managers
and directors can attend meetings without leaving their desks. These
managers and directors could maintain residences in different jurisdictions
(including tax havens), making it harder for high tax countries to assert that
corporations are residents of their jurisdictions.
An OECD Technical Advisory Group has proposed changes to the
treatment of corporate residence issues within the OECD model tax treaty,
in part as a way to alleviate the concerns noted above.31 The proposal
involves the inclusion of a hierarchical tie-breaker rule similar to the one
used for individuals. Proposed Article 4(3)(b) of the OECD model tax
treaty reads: "if the State in which its place of effective management is
situated cannot be determined or if its place of effective management is in
neither State, it shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State [Option A:
with which its economic relations are closer] [Option B: in which its
business activities are primarily carried on] [Option C: in which its senior
executive decisions are primarily taken]." 32
The OECD TAG indicates that, under Option A, the corporation
would be resident in the state in which it is making greater use of economic
resources as well as legal, financial, physical and social infrastructures.
33
This could involve an analysis of factors including the location of most of
the firm's employees and assets, revenues, senior management functions,
headquarters, etc. Under Option B, residency would be determined by a
functional analysis of the activities performed in the two countries. Finally,
under Option C, a corporation would be a resident of the country in which
the clear majority of senior executive decisions are taken and where the
individuals' deposits, winnings, or losses to anyone. It is up to you to declare information
to the proper authorities in your residential jurisdiction." See World Sport's International
web site, at http://betwsi.com/online sports betting frequently asked questions .html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
30 Canada, for instance, employs both the incorporation test and the place of effective
management and control test to determine corporate residency. See VERN KRISHNA,
INCOME TAX LAW 30-32 (1997). For a comparative discussion of several countries on this
issue, see HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 349-350 (2 nd ed. 2004).
31 See OECD TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP, PLACE OF EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT
CONCEPT: SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES TO THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION,
(Discussion Draft, 2003). ["OECD Effective Management Report"].
32 Id. at 3.
33 Id. at 5.
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corporate headquarters are located. By emphasizing the need for
substantive economic activities prior to a determination of residency, the
new tests may make it harder to manipulate corporate residency in the
context of e-commerce operations.
4. Services and Permanent Establishments
As part of its review of e-commerce tax reform issues, the OECD
Business Profits TAG has proposed in a draft discussion that rules
governing the taxation of cross-border service income be altered within the
OECD model tax treaty. 34 Under the proposed changes, source countries
would be able to tax income from services if a non-resident firm or its
representatives is present in the source country for a period of time. 35 The
proposal would replace the current permanent establishment requirement
with a physical presence test that is similar to the one in the United Nations
model tax treaty. 36 The rationale for the proposal is, in part, that service
providers are very mobile and can generate significant income in foreign
countries without the need to set up a physical facility or use a fixed base of
operations.
37
The Information Technology Association of America has argued
that the proposed changes would increase compliance costs for technology
firms along with greater business uncertainty surrounding whether a foreign
government can impose its income taxes on service providers.38 Under this
view, e-commerce companies may be exposed to tax liability in multiple
jurisdictions even though these companies normally remotely provide
services only through the Internet along with occasional maintenance or
service visits to the foreign countries where they conduct business. The
proposal, however, would appear to be consistent with recent changes to the
OECD model tax treaty commentary on permanent establishments that
indicate a permanent establishment will be created if, in the course of
providing consulting or other services to a client, the foreign taxpayer or its
employees use the client's premises for a "long extended period of time."
39
34 See OECD BUSINESS PROFITS TAG, ARE THE CURRENT TREATY RULES FOR TAXING
BUSINESS PROFITS APPROPRIATE FOR E-COMMERCE? 232-251, 349 (Public Discussion
Draft, 2003) ["OECD Business Profits TAG Report"].
35 [d. at 232.
36 See United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and
Developing Countries, (New York, United Nations, 1980) ["United Nations model tax
treaty"], at art. 5(3) & 14(1).
31 See OECD Business Profits TAG Report, supra note 34, at 238-239.
38 See ITAA Expresses Concern over Proposed Changes to OECD Model Treaty, 2004
TNT 42-23 (2004).
39 See OECD model tax treaty, supra note 6, at Commentary on Art. 5 at 4.3.
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C. OECD VAT REFORM EFFORTS
As mentioned, the OECD traditionally promotes reform efforts in
the international income arena primarily via its model tax treaty and the
Commentary to this treaty. All OECD members (other than the United
States) employ federal consumption taxes alternatively referred to as Value-
Added Taxes or Goods and Services Taxes (collectively referred to as
VATs). Yet there are generally no model treaties or bilateral international
agreements that cover VATs.40 As a result, there is no apparent mandate for
the OECD to promote reform efforts for VATs and, prior to the rise of e-
commerce, the organization had never pursued any meaningful reform
efforts in this area.
In 1998, however, the OECD members agreed through the Ottawa
Taxation Framework to consider VAT reform efforts in the context of
global e-commerce. Importantly, the Ottawa Taxation Framework resolved
an ongoing debate among OECD member states surrounding the
appropriate tax jurisdiction for cross-border VAT purposes: the OECD
countries agreed that for business-to-consumer (B2B) supplies the place of
consumption should be the jurisdiction in which the recipient has his or her
usual residence and for business-to-business (B2B) supplies tax should
apply in the jurisdiction in which the recipient has located its business
presence. 41 This development helped to legitimize the European Union
efforts, discussed subsequently, to impose collection and remittance
obligations on non-European Union consumers who have engaged in B2C
transactions with European businesses.
After 1998, the OECD developed guidelines for tax collection
mechanisms for cross-border VAT purchases and began to publish a
'Consumption Tax Guidance Series' to promote consensus on the
application of VATs with respect to international transactions. 42  More
specifically, an effort has been undertaken to promote consensus on reform
efforts to: verify the jurisdiction and status of customers; contemplate
registration thresholds whereby companies with below-threshold sales
would not need to register for VAT purposes; deploy technology-based
collection mechanisms; develop international administrative cooperation;
and review simplification options and initiatives. Importantly, the views of
40 There are minor exceptions to this rule such as the non-discrimination provision within
the Canada-United States tax treaty that covers federal consumption taxes such as Canada's
Goods and Services Tax. See art. XXV(10) of the Canada-U.S. Tax Convention (1980).
Moreover, multilateral trade agreements at times cover federal-level and subnational (e.g.,
state or provincial) consumption taxes. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement
(1994) at art. 3(a).
41 See OTTAWA TAXATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 8.
42 See OECD IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
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business representatives and non-OECD governments were taken into
consideration with respect to potential cross-border VAT reform efforts.
43
II. NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN UNION REACTIONS
This Part surveys the responses by individual countries to challenges
presented by international e-commerce. The survey discusses reform efforts
in seventeen different countries where, for the most part, the responses have
been tepid, often confined to agreeing or disagreeing with positions taken
by the OECD. More specifically, the survey uncovered: seventeen
administrative pronouncements by national tax authorities; five cases; and
two tax laws (including a European Union directive on value-added taxes)
passed to address international e-commerce matters. The Part concludes by
discussing possible explanations for the lack of reaction at the national
level, apart from OECD influence, including the absence of evidence of
source country income tax base erosion resulting from international e-
commerce transactions.
A. NATIONAL LAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE, AND JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
1. Austria
With respect to the server/permanent establishment issue, the
Austrian tax authorities will follow the OECD model tax treaty
Commentary. 44  In 2000, the Austrian Constitutional Court held that a
special withholding tax on e-commerce transactions may be constitutionally
acceptable as long as the tax, among other things, is restricted to




In 2002, Canadian tax authorities issued an Interpretation Bulletin to
assist with the enforcement of its VAT (called the Goods and Services Tax)
on international e-commerce transactions.46  The Canadian changes
4 Id. at 36.
44 See Global PE Risk, supra note 14, at 5.
45 For discussion, see Jurgen Reiner, Austria, in IFA Report, supra note 3, at 265.
46 See CCRA, TECHNICAL INFORMATION BULLETIN B-090 "GST/HST AND ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE" (Bulletin B-090) ["GST E-commerce Bulletin"]; CCRA, EXCISE AND
GST/HST RULINGS, POLICY AND LEGISLATION, "GST/HST AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
A DISCUSSION PAPER FOR PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOODS AND
SERVICES TAX/HARMONIZED SALES TAX IN AN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ENVIRONMENT,"
November 2001.
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generally maintain the status quo with respect to collection obligations for
non-resident firms and rejected the more aggressive views set out in the
European Union e-commerce VAT directive. For example, the Canadian
approach advocates a multi-factoral test (e.g., the place of contracting and
the place where assets are located should be taken into consideration) to
determine whether the non-resident business should register for GST
purposes 47 while the EU approach mandates collection obligations for all
non-EU firms with online sales to consumers residing within the European
Union (see below).
In 1998, Revenue Canada (as it was then) refused to take a position
when a U.S. company asked about the tax implications of storing
proprietary information on a Canadian-based server.48 At this writing, the
Canada Revenue Agency has prepared draft Interpretation Bulletins that
discuss the OECD positions on server/PEs and income characterization.
49
Under domestic Canadian law, a withholding tax of 15% applies on
payments for services performed by a non-resident in Canada. 50  When
these services are provided by a computer software hotline service, the
Canadian tax authorities have taken the position that withholding is not
required because the service provider was physically located outside of
Canada. 51 This position could be analogized with the provision of other
cross-border electronic communications.
3. France
French tax authorities have gone on record with respect to the
server/PE issue and have developed a slightly different version of
server/PEs when compared to the approach adopted into the Commentary to
the OECD model tax treaty. In 2001, the then-Finance Minister confirmed
that as a general rule servers alone will not constitute a permanent
establishment without human activity associated with the server's
operation.52  However, in narrow circumstances where the business
transaction within France involves the "complete and autonomous cycle of
business transactions" then a permanent establishment may be formed.53
47 Id. at 29-31.
48 See Revenue Canada, Internal Memo 981646 (Aug. 3 1, 1998).
49 See also Canada Revenue Agency, Income Tax Technical News no. 33 (sept. 16, 2005)
(noting that the Canada Revenue Agency determines the existence of a permanent
establishment by "examining the specific facts of the situation in light of the particular
words of a treaty, the jurisprudence, and the OECD Model Commentary.").
50 See section 105 of the Regulations to the Income Tax Act (Canada).
51 See CCRA Document No. 5-3857, Nov. 20, 1987, as reported in Robin J. MacKnight &
Charles Ormrod, Canada, in IFA Report, supra note 3, at 307, 319-320.
52 See Ministerial reply 56961, Official Gazette of 22 January 2001, as reported in
Marcellin N. Mbwa-Mboma, France, OECD Take Different Views of Unstaffed Servers as
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According to an observer, the difference between the French and OECD
positions is that the OECD approach emphasizes that as a general rule a
server alone can constitute a permanent establishment unless its functions
are purely preparatory or auxiliary while the French position envisions a
more restrictive test where the server needs to perform virtually all aspects
of a business transaction before a permanent establishment is constituted.54
4. Germany
Germany's tax authorities have issued regulations on the taxation of
permanent establishments, but have not provided guidance with respect to
the computer server issue. A directive issued by the Karlsruhe Regional
Tax Office in 1998 indicates that servers can be considered to be fixed
places of business but should generally not constitute permanent
establishments because they normally perform activities of a preparatory or
auxiliary character.
55
The first German tax court to address the issue of server/PE status
held that a server based in Switzerland and owned by a German corporation
would constitute a permanent establishment in Switzerland under the
Germany-Switzerland tax treaty.56  The German company transferred
information content to the Swiss-based server, where it was accessed by
Swiss customers who paid a fee via their televisions. The sums paid were
collected by Swiss Telecom and forwarded to the German company, less a
collection fee. The German company did not maintain any individuals in
Switzerland to service or program the server. The German company
deducted a fee for its services then forwarded the remaining amounts to a
corporate affiliate that produced the content.
The German court held that Switzerland was entitled to tax profits
attributable to the Swiss-based server although the quantum of these profits
was not discussed. While an English translation of this case does not
appear to be available, one report notes that the court would permit the
Swiss tax authorities "to attribute a substantial amount of income" to the
server.5 7 The court based its decision in part on earlier precedents that held
that underground oil pipelines could constitute permanent establishments
even without the presence of personnel. Moreover, the court cited the
OECD changes to the commentary of the OECD model tax treaty (then in
draft form) as support for its position that the court should scrutinize on a
54 
[d.
55 See KPMG, Lower Court Sees Server as Permanent Establishment, INTERNATIONAL TAX
REVIEW (March 2002), available at
http://www.legalmediagroup.com/internationaltaxreview/default.asp?Page-3&SID- 1834&
M-3&Y-2002.
56 See Case No. I R 86/01(Schleswig-Holstein Tax Court, Sept. 6, 2001)
57 Tamu Wright, German Court Considers Whether Computer Server Can Constitute PE, 3
BNA NEWS (April 2, 2002).
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"case-by-case" basis whether the server is performing auxiliary or
preparatory activities. At this writing, the decision was under appeal to the
Federal Tax Court.
5. Greece
Greece, like Portugal and Spain, has inserted an observation into the
OECD model tax treaty Commentary that it may not follow the OECD's
recent Commentary changes to create a server/PE category.
5 8
6. Hong Kong (China)
In 2001, the Hong Kong tax authorities issued a Departmental
Interpretation and Practice Note (DIPN) that indicates that Hong Kong tax
authorities will apply neutral tax rules to e-commerce so that no particular
business will have a tax advantage over another. 59 A DIPN is not binding
authority and can be overturned by a court or administrative board of
review.
The DIPN rejects the OECD's view that servers alone can constitute
permanent establishments in certain circumstances: "[T]he Department will
generally accept that the mere presence of a server does not constitute a
PE."6° This view is based on the fact that the definition of permanent
establishment within Hong Kong's domestic tax law implies the need for a
physical place as well as personnel.61 With respect to determining profits
attributable to a server based in Hong Kong (along with personnel), the
"proper approach is to focus more on what and where the underlying
physical operations were carried out by the taxpayer to earn the profits in
question than on what had been done electronically." 62 This view departs to
a certain extent from the OECD view that would scrutinize the functions
performed by the server to determine profits attributable to the computer
equipment.
With respect to cross-border income characterization issues, Hong
Kong's views comport with the recent changes to the Commentary to the
OECD model tax treaty in that they emphasize scrutinizing the substance of
the electronic transfer to see if payment should be subject to withholding
taxes: "If the payment is in truth a payment for a product or service, it will
[not be subject to withholding]. On the other hand, if it is a payment for the
use of, or the right to use, copyrighted material, it is deemed to [be subject
51 See OECD model tax treaty, supra note 6, at Commentary on art. 5, 45.6.
59 See INLAND REVENUE DEPT. (HONG KONG), DEPARTMENTAL INTERPRETATION &




61 Id. at II and 12.
62 Id. at 14.
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to withholding as a royalty payment.], 63 Under this view, e-commerce
transactions such as cross-border sales to consumers of shrink-wrapped




India is likely the most active non-OECD member with respect to
developing positions on the taxation of international e-commerce. In 2001,
a report prepared by the Indian Revenue Department's Foreign Tax
Division advised the abandonment of the traditional permanent
establishment concept in light of e-commerce developments:
The Committee is of the view that applying the existing
principles and rules to e-commerce does not ensure certainty of
tax burden and maintenance of the existing equilibrium in
sharing of tax revenues between countries of residence and
source. The Committee is also firmly of the view that there is
no possible liberal interpretation of the existing rules, which can
take care of these issues, as suggested by some countries. The
Committee, therefore, supports the view that the concept of PE
[permanent establishment] should be abandoned and a serious
attempt should be made within OECD or the UN to find an
alternative to the concept of PE.65
In addition, the report disagreed with the OECD's view on
withholding taxes, in particular the tax authorities maintained that
software downloads should generally fall within definition of royalties
found within Indian tax treaties and should be subject to withholding.
The report noted that the Indian tax rules that classify cross-border
income coincided with only 15 of the 28 categories set out within the
OECD's income characterization paper.
In 2002, the Indian government announced in its annual budget that
it would not immediately implement the Foreign Tax Division's
recommendations due to the ongoing international discussions of e-
commerce taxation issues.
In one case, Indian tax authorities assessed taxes on the profits
attributable to an Indian-based server owned by VISA (a U.S.-based
multinational firm). 6 VISA requested a resolution by U.S. and Indian tax
63 Id. at 21.
64 Id. at 23.
65 See Ministry of Finance (India), Report of the High Powered Committee on E-Commerce
and Taxation 11-12 (2001).
66 For discussion, see Richard L. Doernberg, Electronic Commerce: Changing Income Tax
Treaty Principles a Bit?, 89 TAx NOTES 1625, 1627-1630 (2000).
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authorities under the competent authorities provision of the U.S.-India tax
treaty. The settlement remains confidential although it has been reported
that the U.S. and Indian competent authorities agreed the server will
constitute a permanent establishment (the amount of profits attributable to
this server remains unclear).67
There are additional reports that India assessed withholding taxes on
foreign e-commerce firms. 68  However, India's Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal (ITAT) reportedly declined to assess withholding taxes on
payments for periodic subscription fees paid by an Indian company to a
U.S. company for electronic access to published materials.69 The materials
were maintained on a database within a server located outside of India and
the payments were held to be payments for business profits rather than
royalties and thus not liable to tax in India in the absence of a permanent
establishment. The ITAT found that the payment to the non-resident
company was for the use of copyrighted material and not for the transfer of
the copyright itself. Moreover, the ITAT indicated that payment for access
to an electronic database cannot be said to be consideration "for use of
information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience" so
as to fall under the definition of royalty under article 12(3)(a) of the India-
U.S. tax treaty. The ITAT's ruling appears to be consistent with the
OECD's views, noted previously, on the characterization of royalty and
business income with respect to cross-border e-commerce subscription
payments.
In 2004, Indian tax authorities issued a Circular that sets out how
foreign businesses (Business Process Outsourcing Units or BPOs) are to be
taxed when they outsource aspects of their operations to individuals and
businesses residing within India.71 When foreign companies outsource
activities to Indian-based technology centers (which constitute a permanent
establishment) and these activities enable the foreign firms to carry on core
business activities abroad, the Circular maintained that India should be
entitled to tax profits attributable to sales generated abroad (provided that
the Indian permanent establishment has been charged an arm's length fee by
its foreign parent). According to the Circular, "a considerable portion" of
67 See Jonathan Rickman, Indian, U.S. Authorities Agree Server Constitutes PE, 32 TAX
NOTES INT'L 134 (2003).
6' For discussion, see Rashmin C. Sanghvi, India, in IFA Report, supra note 3, at 455; Siva
Subramaniam & Sri Rajan, Server as PE in India, 15 J. INT'L TAX. 14 (2004) (concluding
that "Indian tax authorities are likely to continue raising tax assessments against e-
commerce transactions through dedicated servers based in India.").
69 See Sanjay Sanghvi & Rajesh Bhagat, Indian Tribunal Holds Subscription Fees Paid to
Foreign Company Not Taxable in India, 2005 WTD 22-5 (Jan. 2005).
70 
id.
71 See CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES CIRCULAR No. 1/2004, Jan. 2, 2004.
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the profits derived by non-residents from international sales would be
taxable by India.
72
This Circular led to a controversy where it was alleged that India
was being overly aggressive with respect to the taxation of non-resident
firms. As a result, the Circular was withdrawn and replaced with another
Circular. 73  The new Circular simply restates the provisions of profit
attribution and transfer pricing found within Indian tax treaties. Indian tax
authorities appear to be suggesting that traditional tax rules will determine
the appropriate tax treatment: "[I]n determining the profits attributable to an
IT enabled BPO unit constituting a Permanent Establishment, it will be
necessary to determine the price of the services rendered by the Permanent
Establishment to the Head Office ... on the basis of "arm's length
principle."" 74 The arm's length price in turn is determined by reference to
Indian domestic tax law.75 The key area of contention appears to be the
appropriate quantum of profit attribution to Indian-based BPOs.
8. Ireland
The Irish tax authorities have indicated that the mere presence of a
server will not constitute a permanent establishment.
76
9. Mexico
Mexico is an OECD member and supported the recent changes to
the OECD model tax treaty. In addition, Mexican income tax regulations
specify that this model tax treaty should be used in interpreting Mexico's
income tax treaty obligations; hence the model treaty changes surrounding,
inter alia, the characterization of cross-border income and the server/PE
rule have been expressly adopted into Mexican tax law.
77
At times, however, Mexico bases its negotiation position on the
United Nations model tax treaty. For these reasons, the U.S.-Mexico tax
treaty contains a so-called restricted force of attraction provision that
permits the source country to tax activities that do not emanate from the
permanent establishment in some circumstances, which actually serves to
72 id.
7, See CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES, CIRCULAR No. 5/2004, F.No.500/67/2003-FTD
(Sept. 28, 2004), at § 8.
74 Id. at § 6.
75 Id. at § 7.
76 See SPEECH BY DERMOT QUIGLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE REVENUE COMMISSIONERS
(IRELAND), INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ISSUES AND CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
WITHIN REVENUE AUTHORITIES 12 (undated), available at Irish Revenue Tax and Customs,
http://www.revenue.ie/pdf/wtc.pdf (visited Nov. 5, 2004).
77 See Manuel F. Solano, Mexican Tax Reform and Treaty Implications, 18 TAX NOTES
INT'L 533, 533, n.4 (1999).
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inhibit revenue losses in the context of remote e-commerce sales. 78 Under
the restricted force of attraction rule, the source country is permitted to tax
the business profits derived from the sale by a non-resident firm of goods or
merchandise of the same or similar kind as those normally sold through the
permanent establishment. This clause is typically requested by developing
countries to prevent avoidance of tax through the use of a home office in the
foreign country to conduct business normally done at the permanent
establishment.79  The clause, however, will not apply if the foreign
enterprise demonstrates that the sales were not made from the home office
to avoid the tax on profits attributable to a permanent establishment.
As a result of this tax treaty rule, sales from a U.S.-based online
company can be taxed by Mexico as long as similar sales are sold via an
affiliate that maintains a traditional permanent establishment located
somewhere in Mexico. For example, assume that Books Inc. is a large
U.S.-based book retailer. Books Inc. owns retail outlets within Mexico (that
constitute permanent establishments) and also maintains and operates
exclusively from the United States a commercial web site that sells books.
If a Mexican consumer orders online from Books Inc.'s web site then
Mexico is entitled to tax the profits attributable to this sale because the
company already maintains a permanent establishment within Mexico that
sells the same or similar merchandise (unless Books Inc. demonstrates that
its online sales do not have a tax avoidance purpose).
10. Netherland Antilles
The Netherland Antilles government passed a National Ordinance of
Electronic Agreements along with special tax legislation for international
Internet companies that base operations within the country.80 Under the tax
legislation, effective March 2001, Internet companies based in part in the
Netherland Antilles will fall under a special tax regime with a corporate
income tax rate of 2%. 81
11. New Zealand
New Zealand has provided non-binding guidance to taxpayers with
respect to Internet taxation issues, including cross-border income and GST
78 See CONVENTION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF
FISCAL EVASION WITH REPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., S. Treaty
Doc. No. 103-7, art. 7(1), reprinted in 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5903. The OECD generally
opposes the use of restricted force of attraction clauses in tax treaties. See Commentary to
the OECD model tax treaty, supra note 6, at 7(8).
79 For discussion, see Cockfield, supra note 1, at 205-215.
s0 See NATIONAL ORDINANCE ECONOMIC ZONE, NATIONAL GAZETTE NO. 18 (Feb. 12,
2001).
"' Id. at Art. 1 (1). The rate sunsets on January 1, 2026. Id.
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matters. 82 The government, however, does not appear to have passed any
special e-commerce tax legislation although an informal administrative
pronouncement offers examples of the potential income tax and goods and
services tax (GST) implications of cross-border e-commerce transactions
conducted by Australians in New Zealand.83  The pronouncement
additionally notes that: "Where relevant, current tax laws and interpretations
will be applied to e-commerce transactions."
12. Portugal
Portugal has inserted an observation in the OECD model tax treaty




Under Singapore's tax laws, software payments are classified as
royalties, potentially subject to withholding taxes. In 2001, the tax
authorities provided a ministerial order that maintains that payments for
shrink-wrap software and certain other electronic transfers by non-resident
consumers would be exempt from withholding taxes. 85  "Shrink-wrap"
software, site licences, downloadable software, or software bundled with
computer hardware will generally be exempt from withholding taxes.
86
Of interest, the exemption for payments for shrink-wrap software
will only apply if the end user is only granted limited rights of use (e.g., no
right to make copies for commercial purposes), which is the approach
adopted by the income characterization changes to the Commentary to the
OECD model tax treaty.87 But payments for site licenses, downloadable
software or software bundled with computer hardware are not subject to
similar limitations and will not attract withholding, which is contrary to the
approach adopted by the OECD.88 The ministerial order would seem to
impose non-neutral tax treatment between, for example, software sold in
compact discs for commercial purposes (e.g., for copying and resale) which
will be subject to withholding and the same software sold online to
82 See INLAND REVENUE (NEW ZEALAND), GUIDELINES TO TAXATION AND THE INTERNET
(1998).
8, See INLAND REVENUE (NEW ZEALAND), ABOUT YOUR SITUATION ... E-COMMERCE AND
TAX, available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/yoursituation-bus/australian/e-commerce-tax/
84 See OECD model tax treaty, supra note 4, at Commentary on art. 5, 45.6.
85 MINISTERIAL ORDER, INCOME TAX (EXEMPTION OF ROYALTIES AND OTHER PAYMENTS
FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT) NOTIFICATION 2001, No. 297/2001,
amended by S267/2001 (Feb. 21 2001, amended May 8, 2001).
86 [d. at art. 2 to 4.
87 Id. at art. 3.
88 Id. at art. 4.
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Singaporean resident for downloading which will not be subject to
withholding.
In addition, Singaporean tax authorities have published a guide on
the income tax treatment of e-commerce. 89 The guide discusses the income
tax treatment of cross-border tangible and intangible goods. The guide also
confirms that a server alone will not constitute a permanent establishment
under Singapore's domestic tax law.
90
14. Spain
Spain's tax authorities maintain that, regardless of an actual physical
presence, a permanent establishment exists wherever a company regularly
conducts e-commerce transactions. These transactions are deemed to take
place where the purchaser of the goods and services is resident. As a result,
the Spanish government inserted a reservation in the recent server/PE
changes to the Commentary to article 5 of the OECD model tax treaty, like
Portugal, by asserting that the country may not follow the changes "until the
OECD has come to a final conclusion." 91  Moreover, the Spanish tax
authorities take a broader view of the types of e-commerce transactions that
could be subject to withholding, maintaining that downloads of shrink-
wrapped software could attract withholding.
15. Switzerland
The Swiss tax authorities (federal tax administrators or FTA) have
reportedly passed VAT guidelines on the taxation of telecom transactions,
including comments on the tax treatment of electronic commerce.92
16. United Kingdom
In 2000, the United Kingdom's Inland Revenue issued a press
release indicated that servers will never, in and of themselves, be considered
to be a permanent establishment of a foreign company. 93 Inland Revenue
maintained this position even after taking into consideration the
89 See INLAND REVENUE AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, INCOME TAX GUIDE ON E-COMMERCE
(3 rd ed., 2001).
90Id at 10.
91 See OECD model tax treaty, supra note 6, at Commentary on Art. 5, 45.6.
92 See FTA Brochure 610.507-30 (1997); FTA Brochure 610.540-13 (2000), as reported in
Xavier Oberson, Switzerland, in IFA Report, supra note 3, at 691.
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development of a new server/PE category within the Commentary to the
OECD model tax treaty.
94
In 2000, Inland Revenue issued a technical note that proposed to use
the OECD definition of royalties. The note also discussed proposals to
create new rules for bundled payments where payment is provided for partly
for intellectual property and partly for other items, which has implications
for cross-border e-commerce transfers.
95
Finally, the Inland Revenue has ongoing consultation processes
through the Electronic Commerce Consultation Forum (ECCF), which is
comprised of members drawn from the tax authorities and industry
participants. The ECCF is additionally broken into sub-groups that focus
on specific e-commerce issues such as VAT, cross-border business profits,
characterization, and tax administration and compliance.
17. United States
While Internet developments have led to a number of policy
developments in the area of U.S. state and local sales and use taxes (briefly
discussed in Part II.C.), very little action has taken place at the federal level
with respect to international e-commerce developments. After the 1996
Treasury discussion paper on international taxation of e-commerce, the U.S.
government entered into joint electronic commerce agreements with a
number of other countries (including Australia, Chile, Columbia, the
Netherlands, Ireland, Japan, Jordan and the United Kingdom) that included
a tax provision which, like the one in the European Union-United States
agreement, maintains "taxes on electronic commerce should be clear,
consistent, neutral and non discriminatory. "
96
As discussed above under the heading 'India', the U.S. tax
authorities have entered into an undisclosed settlement agreement with
Indian tax authorities whereby both parties accept that a U.S. taxpayer's
server within India constitutes a permanent establishment. The
interpretation appears to be consistent with the OECD's new server/PE rule.
Finally, as subsequently discussed in Part II.C., the United States
has pursued reform efforts that deal with the tax treatment of software and
intangible assets, which may ultimately assist with the determination of the
appropriate tax treatment for cross-border e-commerce transactions.
94 Id. The United Kingdom has additionally inserted these views within the Commentary
to the OECD model tax treaty. See OECD model tax treaty, supra note 6, at Commentary
on art. 5, 45.5.
95 See INLAND REVENUE, REFORM OF THE TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1999),
as discussed in Gary Richards, UNITED KINGDOM, in IFA Report, supra note 3, at 711,
715-716.
96 See JOINT E.U.-U.S. STATEMENT ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 3(iv) (1997).
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B. EUROPEAN UNION
Effective July 2003, the European Union's directive on electronic
communications (the "E-commerce VAT Directive") requires all non-EU
companies selling digital goods and services online to consumers within the
EU to register with an EU tax authority and charge, collect and remit
VAT. 97  Non-resident businesses can register under an interim "special
scheme" arrangement with one EU member state, which will operate a form
of clearinghouse to ensure that each EU member state receives its
appropriate amount of VAT due to it.98 After remittance, the member state
will redistribute the VAT to the appropriate EU countries in which the
digital goods and services were sold.
The E-commerce VAT Directive is designed in part to address
problems associated with online business-to-consumer (B2C) sales, which
are thought to present the greatest challenge to VAT schemes as consumer
rarely comply with self-assessment obligations. There is less fear that
business-to-business (B2B) sales over the Internet will create compliance
problems because vendors engaged in these transactions have an incentive
to assess, charge and collect VAT in order to receive input tax credits to
offset the VAT payments. 99 The main impetus for the E-commerce VAT
Directive appears to be the EU business lobby, which was concerned that,
in absence of a rule that strived to force foreign suppliers to assess VAT, an
uneven competitive playing field would persist because intra-EU supplies of
goods and services would attract VAT (and corresponding higher prices)
while supplies from non-EU countries could be sold to EU consumers on a
VAT-free basis.
The new e-commerce VAT Directive has created concerns that it
will impose costly collection obligations on non-EU firms.100 An OECD
TAG notes that different approaches to VATs and e-commerce may inhibit
97 See Council Directive 2002/38/EC amending Directive 77/338/EECd as regards the
value added tax arrangements applicable to radio and television broadcasting services and
electronically supplied services, 2002 O.J. (L 128) 41 (May 7, 2002).
98 Earlier proposals would permit non-resident firms to register and charge VAT in only
one EU country and would only have strived to make larger firms comply with the
collection obligations. See COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE AMENDING
DIRECTIVE 77/388/EEC AS REGARDS THE VALUE ADDED TAX ARRANGEMENTS
APPLICABLE TO CERTAIN SERVICES SUPPLIED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS, COM (2000) 349
(proposing to require non-EU companies to collect VAT on sales to EU consumers of
digital products as long as sales into the EU exceed 100,000 Euros).
99 For discussion, see Charles McClure, Jr., The Value Added Tax on Electronic
Commerce in the European Union, 10 INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE 753
(2003).
100 For discussion, see Stephen Bill & Arthur Kerrigan, Practical Application of European
Value Added Tax to E-commerce, 38 GA. L. REV. 71 (2003); Gary Burnes, Businesses and
Governments Express Concern About European Commission's Proposed E-Commerce
VAT Directive, 20 TAX NOTES INT'L, June 20, 2000, at 2750.
SPRING 2006
25
COCKFIELD: THE RISE OF THE OECD AS INFORMAL 'WORLD TAX ORGANIZATION'
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
THE RISE OF THE OECD AS INFORMAL 'WORLD TAX ORGANIZATION'
commercial activities and increase the risk of international double
taxation. 10 1  As previously discussed, in order to counter perceived
problems with respect to emerging cross-border VAT and GST issues, the
OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs has promoted a non-binding
"Consumption Tax Guidance Series" for e-commerce and other issues.
102
Moreover, as mentioned, there are generally no general international
treaties that govern cross-border consumption tax issues (unlike tax treaties,
which are mainly directed at income taxes). In absence of such a treaty, it is
unclear how the European Union plans to enforce its directive. Certain non-
EU firms with online sales such as Amazon.com have voluntarily agreed to
comply with the E-commerce VAT Directive while others such as
AOL/Time Warner have announced that they will set up operations in
European Union countries to assist with compliance.1
0 3
An additional VAT issue surrounds compliance obligations and
cross-border e-commerce sales. Under general VAT laws, countries may
impose collection obligations on foreign companies if these companies
maintain "permanent establishments" within their jurisdictions. Like the
income tax treaty concept of permanent establishment, this is a defined term
in VAT statutes and usually has a similar meaning where fixed places of
businesses can constitute permanent establishments. The European Court
of Justice has held that machinery alone cannot constitute a permanent
establishment for VAT purposes so that the presence of a server alone
within an EU country will not likely constitute a permanent
establishment. 10 4 This position can be contrasted with other consumption
tax laws such as the Canadian one where the presence of a server can
constitute a permanent establishment for Goods and Services Tax purposes
(and hence trigger foreign company collection and remittance obligations)
even without the presence of a human being.1
0 5
101 For a discussion of concerns arising out of the different tax treatment for international
consumption taxes, see OECD IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 7, 14. See also
Keith R. Evans, Cross-Border E-Commerce and the GST/HST Towards International
Consensus or Divergence?, 2 CDN. J. OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2003) (noting different
approaches among the European Union, Canada and Australia).
102 See OECD IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
103 For discussion, see Ebay Users Hit by Sales Tax, BBC NEWS, June 6, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l hi/business/2968106.stm.
104 See Marcellin N. Mbwa-Mboma, France, OECD Take Different Views of Unstaffed
Servers as Permanent Establishments, TAxNOTES INT'L, June 3, 2002, at 1107.
105 See CCRA E-commerce GST Bulletin, supra note 48, at 27 (noting that Canadian GST
legislation should be interpreted so that the definition of "permanent establishment" for
GST purposes can include situations where a computer server alone is owned by a non-
resident firm and is based within Canada).
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C. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LACK OF REACTION
The survey of national responses to e-commerce tax challenges
reveals that governments have chosen to approach these challenges with
caution. A number of reasons could explain the lack of legislative and
administrative action thus far.
First, governments may now be less concerned that e-commerce
developments threaten their tax bases. Revenue losses associated with
international e-commerce transactions are difficult to estimate as there are
currently no empirical studies that attempt to measure these losses. In
addition, there are few studies that demonstrate that e-commerce
developments provide planning opportunities that would lead to base
erosion in relatively high tax jurisdictions like the United States. One
empirical study, however, does show that e-commerce developments may
be facilitating international tax planning for U.S. multinationals although,
again, revenue losses associated with this planning remain uncertain.
0 6
Tax authorities have noted the rise of certain 'grey market' business activity
such as gambling and pornographic web sites located in offshore tax havens
that may be leading to revenue losses, but they do not have firm estimates
of these losses.' °7 An OECD report issued in 2003 notes, "Contrary to early
predictions, there does not seem to be actual evidence that the
communications efficiencies of the internet have caused any significant
decrease to the tax revenues of capital importing countries."
' 10 8
The lack of empirical evidence concerning revenue losses at the
international level can be contrasted with the situation in the U.S.
subnational context where several studies have shown that U.S. state and
local governments are suffering revenue losses in the billions of dollars as a
result of increased remote consumer sales attributable to mail order and
Internet transactions involving tangible goods. 10 9 Moreover, there is at least
106 See Carla Carnaghan and Kenneth J. Klassen, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAX
PLANNING (Working Paper, June 2004) (employing U.S. company data to document that
companies with foreign subsidiaries use export sales to a greater degree when there are tax
advantages to doing so, and that this relation is more pronounced for companies where e-
commerce sales are more prevalent). But see Carla Carnaghan et al., E-Commerce and Tax
Planning: Canadian Experiences, 3 CDN. ACC. PERSP. 8 (2004) (indicating that surveys of
Canadian businesses show that firms rarely take into consideration tax planning issues prior
to deployment of e-commerce strategies).
107 For discussion, see OECD FORUM ON TAX ADMINISTRATION COMPLIANCE SUB-GROUP,
COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT: PROGRESS WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNET
SEARCH TOOLS FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION (2004), § 6 (reviewing how tax authorities are
employing technologies to assist with taxpayer audits).
10' See OECD Business Profits TAG Report, supra note 34, at 74 (advocating that
wholesale reform efforts are not needed to confront e-commerce tax challenges).
109 For discussion, see Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in
the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1 (2003);
Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, 30 ST. TAx NOTES 551 (2003). For
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anecdotal evidence that aggressive tax planning such as entity isolation
strategies has contributed to these revenue losses. 110 This evidence has in
part encouraged U.S. state tax authorities to form the Streamlined Sales Tax
Project whereby state governments are contemplating the radical tax base
harmonization of their sales and use tax systems to encourage voluntary
compliance by firms with out-of-state sales. III Without similar evidence at
the international level, tax authorities and legislative bodies may be
understandably reluctant to focus their attention on an area that may not be
contributing to significant revenue losses.
Second, the area where e-commerce presents the greatest tax
challenges-cross-border business-to-consumer (B2C) sales-likely does
not present significant problems at the present time. Cross-border business-
to-business (B2B) e-commerce sales continue to dominate overall e-
commerce and businesses, unlike consumers, have incentives to report
incoming sales to, for example, justify the expensing of inputs for tax
purposes or to receive credit for these inputs against other VAT
liabilities."l 2 Moreover, some observers maintain that source country base
erosion will not take place because concerns surrounding the withdrawal of
traditional physical presences (e.g., a retail outlet) and the replacement by
revenue loss estimates, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SALES TAXES:
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES; REVENUE LOSSES ARE
UNCERTAIN (GAO/GGD/OCE-00-165) (2000); DONALD BRUCE & WILLIAM Fox, STATE
AND LOCAL REVENUE LOSSES FROM E-COMMERCE: ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2004
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee, Center for Business and Economic Research, 2004)
(estimating losses between U.S.$21.5 billion and U.S.$33.7 billion by 2008).
110 See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Walmart.com: A Case Study in Entity Isolation, 25 ST.
TAX NOTES 33, Aug, 26, 2002 (arguing that nexus attribution theories could be used by
state tax authorities to hold e-tailers and their parent companies liable for uncollected
remote sales taxes). In 2003, Walmart.com and certain other large online retailers agreed
to begin collecting sales taxes on remote consumer transactions in exchange for insulation
from liability for past remote collection practices, agreed to by thirty-eight state tax
authorities. See Eric Chabrow, States, Stores Make Online Sales Tax Deal,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Feb 6, 2003, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD-6512025.
"' As subsequently discussed, compliance by out-of-state vendors must be voluntary
because U.S. states are constitutionally prohibited from mandating compliance as a result
of concerns surrounding the interference with interstate commerce. For discussion on the
Streamlined Sales Tax Project, see, for eaxmple, John A. Swain and Walter Hellerstein,
Recent Amendments to the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: Third-Party
Reimbursements and Bundled Transactions, ST. TAX NOTES 659, Aug. 26, 2005, at 659
and Arthur J. Cockfield, Jurisdiction to Tax: A Law and Technology Perspective, 38 GA. L.
REV. 85 (2003).
112 In 2001, U.S. businesses generated roughly USD$1.1 trillion in e-commerce sales and
revenues. Over 93% of total sales came from B2B transactions (including more traditional
Electronic Data Interchange transactions). Transactions between e-commerce businesses
and consumers (so-called B2C sales) amounted to USD$71 billion in 2001. See UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, E-STATS (March 19, 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/paper/2001 /1002estatstext.pdf
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virtual presences (like a retail website) have been overstated. 113  The
transition of many global e-commerce companies from pure "dot-corns" to
so-called "clicks and mortars" (businesses that have both a virtual and
traditional physical presence) has arguably inhibited revenue losses because
these businesses will continue to maintain physical presences in foreign
markets that may constitute permanent establishments and attract source
country income taxation.
Moreover, the move by large e-tailers like Amazon.com and online
auctions such as Ebay.com to create local foreign subsidiaries (like
Amazon.co.uk and Ebay.co.uk in the United Kingdom) may have reduced
concerns surrounding B2C revenue losses, at least with respect to sales of
tangible goods. Online B2C transactions often remain confined within
countries through the use of these local subsidiaries, belying to a certain
extent earlier predictions of a borderless commercial world for regulatory
purposes." 4 Finally, in certain cases large Web-based multinational firms
have voluntarily agreed to abide by foreign tax laws, which reduced the
necessity for legislative steps to set out the scope and obligations of these
firms. As discussed previously, for example, Amazon.com and AOL/Time
Warner have agreed to strive to comply with the European Union's VAT
directive that strives to place VAT compliance obligations on foreign
businesses for B2C transactions. As discussed, the OECD is also assisting
with the development of new practices and technologies to encourage
compliance with cross-border VAT rules for e-commerce.115
Third, certain countries have tax laws that clarify the tax treatment
of software programs and intangible assets, which may provide a
framework by analogy to resolve e-commerce tax issues. 116 For instance,
the U.S. Treasury Department first proposed draft regulations in 1996 on
the classification of computer program transactions. 117 These regulations
113 See Gary D. Sprague & Rachel Hersey, Permanent Establishments and Internet-
Enabled Enterprises: The Physical Presence and Contract Concluding Dependent Agent
Tests, 38 GA. L. REV. 299, 300 (2003) (arguing that business model changes have not taken
place that would enable significant cross-border sales without the need for a local physical
presence).
114 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (1996)(arguing that cyberspace should be
treated as "a separate 'space' to which distinct laws apply."). The commercial
developments along with the apparent ability of existing international tax laws to deal with
these developments appear to be more consistent with the view that cyberspace
developments can be addressed through traditional regulatory tools. See, e.g., Jack L.
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998) (arguing that traditional
legal tools of jurisdiction apply to Internet transactions).
115 See OECD IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 7; OECD, CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY
AND ADMINISTRATION, FACILITATING COLLECTING OF CONSUMPTION TAXES ON BUSINESS-
TO-CONSUMER CROSS-BORDER E-COMMERCE (2005).
116 See, e.g., IFA Report, supra note 3 (discussing efforts by country reporters to apply
traditional tax laws to e-commerce developments).
117 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18, 61 Fed. Reg. 58, 153 (1996).
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clarified that, for purposes of determining whether royalty income is
generated, taxpayers should determine what type of copyright has been
transferred; the transaction will generally be treated as a sale of goods (and
not a copyright license that would generate royalties) as long as the
purchaser does not receive the right to reproduce the software for
distribution to the public. Like the OECD income classification rules
discussed previously, the U.S. regulations strive to treat functionally
equivalent transactions the same way. U.S. taxpayers may be able to use
these rules to determine the appropriate tax treatment for cross-border
digital transfers of goods and services.
In addition, the United States has proposed new regulations to
govern the tax treatment of non-arm's length transactions in cross-border
services, including transactions involving intangible property. 118 Proposed
rules strive to inhibit disguised transfers of intangibles without adequate
compensation where the transaction is characterized by the taxpayer as a
transfer of services only. For bundled transactions that involve a services
transaction and a transfer of an intangible, taxpayers must choose valuation
methods that take into account each component of the transaction.
Intellectual property laws of the relevant jurisdiction will determine legal
ownership of the intangible or, if this approach is unworkable, ownership
will be determined by looking to which controlled party controls the
intangible. Rules also assist in valuing intangibles that have been enhanced
or developed by another controlled taxpayer.
These tax rules could be applied to many e-commerce transactions
that involve the cross-border transfer of digital goods and services. The
rules seem sensible as they can be imposed in a neutral manner between e-
commerce and traditional transactions and thus comport with the OECD's
guidelines in this area that are espoused by the Ottawa Taxation
Framework. 119 In addition, this approach does not involve any significant
departure from traditional international tax rules or principles and, again,
appears to be consistent with the Ottawa Taxation Framework conditions.
Fourth, it may be too soon to gauge the national reaction to e-
commerce tax challenges as governments and their tax authorities may be in
the midst of preparing legislation or administrative guidance. 120 Also, my
118 See DEPT. OF TREASURY, TREATMENT OF SERVICES UNDER SECTION 482; ALLOCATION
OF INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS FROM INTANGIBLES, 26 C.F.R. Parts I & 31, 68 Fed Reg. 53,
448. For discussion of emerging tax rules to govern the taxation of intangibles in the
United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, see Andrew Lymer et al., Taxing the
Intangible: Overview of Global Approaches and a Review of Recent Policy Changes in the
UK, 18 AUSTRALIAN TAXATION FORUM 431 (2003).
119 See OTTAWA TAXATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 8.
120 See, e.g., RICHARD BIRD, TAXING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A REVOLUTION IN THE
MAKING 18-19 (C.D. Howe Commentary, Sept. 2003) (concluding that "minor fixes" will
suffice to meet e-commerce tax challenges in the short term although more comprehensive
reform efforts may be necessary in the longer term).
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survey within this Part may have inadvertently missed efforts by
governments to address global e-commerce tax concerns, possibly
understating the extent of this reaction.
The next Part explores an alternative explanation, noted elsewhere,
whereby national tax authorities and their governments deferred to the
OECD to resolve many of the pressing tax issues presented by international
121e-commerce.
III. LESSONS FROM THE OECD's E-COMMERCE TAX REFORM PROCESS
AND OUTCOME
The Part strives to promote a better understanding of the reasons that
underlie the general success of the OECD's e-commerce tax reform efforts
along with lessons that can be learned from these efforts. The first section
argues that the OECD's 'informal' e-commerce reform process, which
included the promotion of guiding principles, consultation, deliberation, and
the use of non-binding mechanisms, amounted to unprecedented global tax
cooperation and was generally successful in confronting international e-
commerce tax policy challenges. The second section argues that the
OECD's success in the e-commerce arena demonstrates that calls for a
formal World Tax Organization, which could bind national tax rules of
participating nations, may be misplaced. To operate as a truly informal
world tax authority, the last section discusses the need to formalize the
OECD's outreach efforts to non-OECD member states to promote a more
inclusive forum for consultation and deliberation.
A. HEIGHTENED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH INFORMAL
INSTITUTIONS
The previous Parts reviewed how the OECD took a leadership role
in the development of international e-commerce tax reform principles,
which were accepted by the OECD member states. 122  This section
discusses how the OECD's use of 'soft institutions', enhanced voice, and
121 Ducan Bentley has similarly noted that the OECD's e-commerce tax reform effort has
influenced the national policy response: "It is clear that it will now be difficult for any
sovereign state to opt for an approach to international taxation of electronic commerce that
does not reflect the consensus obtained through the work of the OECD." See Duncan
Bentley, International Constraints on National Tax Policy, 30 TAx NOTES INT'L 1127,
1140 (2003) (describing OECD efforts with respect to, among other things, anti-corruption,
information exchange, and harmful tax competition).
122 See also Chuck Gnaedinger, TNI Interview: Joseph H. Guttentag, 36 TAX NOTES INT'L
311, 316 (2004) (providing Guttentag's view that the OECD e-commerce tax reform "has
made tremendous progress in creating a basic platform which has served to permit the
imposition of appropriate taxes while preventing our tax systems from undercutting the
growth of this remarkable industry.").
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increased outreach to non-OECD member states assisted with reform
efforts. The section also notes that the server/PE example offers a
cautionary tale about the OECD process.
1. Soft Institutions
As discussed in Part I, the OECD's e-commerce tax reform process
did not involve any institutions that can bind the tax policy of its member
countries in any way. The Working Groups and other expert groups serve
as fora to explore different policy alternatives, but cannot enact any changes
without broad support and consensus by OECD members. The OECD
model tax treaty or its Commentary are not binding, and members are
permitted to insert reservations and observations that set out dissenting
views.
To a certain extent, the OECD approach of encouraging discussion,
study, and non-binding reform efforts resembles the phenomenon of 'soft
institutions.' Soft institutions are said be more informal processes
employed to achieve consensus by providing a forum for actors to negotiate
non-binding rules, such as principles, instead of binding conventions: "Soft
institution building can provide more flexibility to actors, including the
private sector, to implement the consensus." 123 The OECD approach is
consistent with emerging views in international relations theory that
"government networks" (e.g., relatively informal arrangements among
government officials in the same agencies) may be best at addressing global
challenges. 124  Informally coordinated and networked action by
governments, it is thought, may lead to a new form of international law- and
policy-making that addresses these challenges without imposing undue
restrictions on national sovereignty.
125
Similarly, the use of non-binding institutions promotes the interests
of the OECD members by reducing tax obstacles to international trade and
investment (thus encouraging national economic growth) while protecting
tax sovereignty to the greatest extent possible. As subsequently discussed
in Part III.B., the preservation of tax sovereignty is likely a necessary
prerequisite for the development of widely-accepted tax rules. The OECD
process more closely resembles customary international law, which is
123 See Suh-Yong Chung, Is the Mediterranean Regional Cooperation Model Applicable to
Northeast Asia?, 11 GEO. INT'L ENv. L. R. 363, 395 (1999).
124 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
125 But see Kenneth Anderson, Book Review: Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty
and Global Governance through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255
(2005) (concluding that global networks may unduly erode sovereignty interests).
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perhaps best understood as a set of normative expectations developed
through observation of the actions of states.
1 26
As is the case in other areas of customary international law, peer
pressure and the need to promote business certainty (again to promote
national economic welfare) encourages the OECD member states to follow
the consensus views once they have been adopted into the OECD model tax
treaty. In contrast, conventional international law typically involves the use
of treaties that, once entered into, create continuing obligations, unlike the
OECD model tax treaty. Through the use of informal mechanisms, the
OECD mediates and manages the expectations of its member states in an
attempt to generate politically acceptable (and hopefully effective)
international tax policy. 
127
2. Enhanced Voice
With respect to the OECD's e-commerce tax reform efforts, Duncan
Bentley notes, "It was one of the first occasions when new policy initiatives
were developed at an international level before at least the OECD
jurisdictions had first developed domestic policy positions. It was also the
first time that public consultation both within and outside the OECD had
taken place to that extent in developing new policies on international
taxation."128
The OECD e-commerce tax reform efforts arguably generated a
series of 'firsts', discussed in Part I, that amounted to unprecedented
international tax cooperation:
(a) it was the first time that countries engaged in multilateral
discussions that led to agreement on principles-the Ottawa Taxation
Framework--that would guide the subsequent formulation of international
tax rules;
(b) it was the first time that the OECD joined with members of industry
to agree to a framework-the Joint Declaration of Business and
Government Representatives-to guide the development of new rules; 
129
126 For discussion, see Aaron Schwabach and Arthur J. Cockfield, The Role of International
Law and Institutions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 611, 613 (UNESCO:
Oxford, 2002).
127 See, e.g., Robert Wolfe, See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis) Representation of the Trading
System, 11(3) J. INT'L RELATIONS 339, 358 (2005) (arguing that, under an Fullerian
understanding of international law, conventional international law is in fact similar to
customary international law because the latter provides transparency, consensual
knowledge and legitimation for the regime even though it does provide sanctions through
formal dispute resolution processes).
128 See Bentley, supra note 121, at 1139.
129 The first agree-upon principle of this document reads "The implementation of a taxation
framework for electronic commerce, and the administrative arrangements that support that
framework, are priorities, and governments and the business sector must co-operate in this
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(c) it was the first time that the OECD analyzed policy options in an
extensive way through the publication of multiple discussion drafts of
reports (that sometimes included both majority and minority viewpoints)
from Technical Advisory Groups and Working Parties consisting of tax
experts drawn from national tax authorities, industry and academics;
(d) it was the first time that non-OECD countries were permitted to be
part of ongoing deliberations along with the development of policy options
through the appointment of representatives from non-OECD governments
to Technical Advisory Groups; 130 and
(e) it was the first time that OECD member states engaged in extensive
discussions with respect to cross-border Value-Added Tax (VAT) issues,
and attempted to promote consensus-driven reform efforts in this area.
The use of Working Parties and TAGs provided a forum for tax
experts to deliberate in an extensive manner prior to the attainment of
consensus. In particular, the decision to extend TAG membership to
representatives from industry and non-OECD member states likely played a
strong role in encouraging participants to 'buy in' to the recommended
changes as they had a chance to voice their concerns from the outset. The
survey in Part II supports this view as the OECD member states have not
generally developed tax laws or administrative positions that are contrary to
the OECD view (with, as subsequently discussed, the exception of the
server/PE issue): it serves as evidence that the OECD countries made good
on their promise, by signing onto the Ottawa Taxation Framework
conditions, to abide by the consensus view. Interestingly, it was technology
change, and not traditional policy concerns, that provoked this
unprecedented global tax cooperation. 131
The OECD e-commerce tax reform process encouraged cooperative
efforts by providing significant opportunities for input without imposing
any intrusive restrictions on the tax policy of the member countries. 132 The
work in order to realise the full potential of the new technologies."[my italics]. See also,
Joint Declaration, supra note 10.
"0 See, e.g., OECD IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13.
131 See Howard E. Abrams & Richard L. Doemberg, How Electronic Commerce Works, 14
TAX NOTES INT'L 1573, 1589 (1997) ("What may be a sound rule from a tax policy
perspective may be totally unworkable in light of available technology .... Perhaps the most
significant implication of the growth of electronic commerce for tax policy may be that
technology rather than policy will determine the tax rules of the 21st century."). For
discussion on the need to develop a coherent legal theory or analytical framework to
promote a better understanding of the interplay between law and technology, see Arthur J.
Cockfield, Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30 MAN. L. J. 383 (2004).
132 For arguments in favor of this approach, see Jeffrey Owens, Emerging Issues in Tax
Reform: The Perspective of an International Bureaucrat, 97 TNI 245-23 (1997)
(advocating the use of multilateral processes that encourage tax cooperation, rather than tax
harmonization reform efforts); Stanford G. Ross, National versus International Approaches
to Cross-Border Tax Issues, 54 TAX NOTES 589 (1992) (advocating enhanced multilateral
cooperation and coordination); Jack M. Mintz, Is National Tax Policy Viable in the Face of
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combination of providing enhanced opportunities to voice concerns along
with the use of soft institutions likely assisted with the development of
effective reform that was acceptable to the OECD member states.
133
Moreover, the inherently conservative view in the Ottawa Taxation
Framework and the Joint Declaration of Business and Government
Representatives to use traditional international tax principles in the
development of tax rules for e-commerce seems, in hindsight, the most
effective reform path.
In contrast, the reform solutions proposed by certain tax observers,
including this author, can now be portrayed as over-reaching.134 In order to
address possible source base erosion resulting from cross-border e-
commerce sales, commentators proposed reform efforts including: (a) low,
medium or high withholding tax rates for e-commerce payments; (b)
qualitative economic presence tests (i.e., facts and circumstances tests) to
enable source countries to tax e-commerce payments despite the absence of
a traditional physical presence within the source country; (c) quantitative
economic presence tests (e.g., permit source countries to tax above
threshold sales such as $1 million in sales); or (d) global formulary
apportionment with destination sales as one of the factors to encourage
source country taxation.' 
35
The lack of evidence surrounding source state base erosion resulting
from e-commerce sales (discussed in Part II.C.), however, suggests that the
OECD's more conservative reform path and insistence on applying
traditional principles as well as the same tax rules to e-commerce and
conventional commerce was likely the better approach. As previously
noted, in the longer term an increase in international e-commerce-
particularly in the sensitive tax area of cross-border B2C digital sales-may
call for a re-evaluation of traditional rules and principles.
The OECD members have a lengthy history with respect to
negotiating tax treaties based on the OECD model treaty, which in turn was
based on earlier model treaties. 136  Moreover, the fact that the OECD
member states cooperated effectively together on e-commerce reform may
lead to enhanced loyalty that could encourage viable solutions in other areas
Global Competition?, 19 TAx NOTES INT'L 99 (1999) (discussing the need for greater
coordination among national governments to limit the adverse effects of globalization).
133 See also Charles E. McLure Jr., Globalization, Tax Rules and National Sovereignty,
BULL. INT'L FiSC. DOC. 328, 340 (2001) (noting that the OECD's e-commerce reform
strategy, in contrast to its harmful taxation project, sought to negotiate areas of possible
constraint on tax sovereignty).
134 1 argued that the international e-commerce income tax challenges could be addressed by
bilaterally negotiating changes to tax treaties to promote the use of a low-rate withholding
tax for e-commerce payments, an increased use of the restricted force of attraction rule to
enhance source state taxation, and greater resort to the residual profit split methodology for
transfer pricing purposes. See Cockfield, supra note 1, at 185-216.
135 See, e.g., the sources in note 2.
136 For discussion on the OECD's history, see note 5.
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of policy concern. According to Hirschman, this Loyalty reduces the need
for an equilibrium between Voice (the ability to express views on issues)
and Exit (the ability to leave situations that impose overly restrictive
conditions) as parties begin to trust each and accept a 'give and take'
relationship where they are more willing to provide concessions in one area
as they expect to receive concessions in other areas at some future date. 
137
Because of the history of cooperation along with more recent efforts,
it may be the case that the OECD member states have learned to trust the
OECD process to the point where they are increasingly prepared to accept
the OECD's leadership in resolving other areas of international tax policy
concern, including binding multilateral mechanisms in limited areas such as
transfer pricing arbitration. At a minimum, the trust encourages more
modest efforts, such as enhanced multilateral information exchange,
consistent transfer pricing documentation requirements and advanced
pricing agreement (APA) procedures.
138
3. Server/PEs: A Cautionary Tale
While the OECD e-commerce tax reform efforts appear to have been
generally successful, the development of the server/PE rule provides a
cautionary tale on tax reform efforts undertaken by the OECD. In its
discussion draft issued in December 1996, the Treasury Department
reviewed the issue of server/PEs and concluded that servers would not
likely constitute a permanent establishment under traditional tax principles:
the report noted that international e-commerce would likely be best
addressed by residence-based taxation. 139 Moreover, the IRS has narrowly
construed the definition of permanent establishment in the past to exempt
many business activities that are preparatory or auxiliary in character, such
as the collection of information by a bank or the supervision of a
construction site by a consulting firm. 14  In its first discussion of the issue,
137 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY - RESPONSES TO THE DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970). Hirschman's model has been used as an
explanatory device to assist with understanding, among other things, European Union
political and economic integration efforts. See Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE L. J. L. 2403 (1991 ).
138 These efforts already occur on a multilateral basis for the members of the Pacific
Association of Tax Administrators (PATA), including the United States, through its mutual
agreement procedures (MAP) and (BAPA) bilateral advanced pricing agreements.
139 See Treasury Report, supra note 1, at §§ 7.1.5 & 7.2.3.1.
140 See IRS REVENUE RULING 72-418, 1972-2 C.B. 661 (exempting the U.S. office of a
German bank from permanent establishment status because the office was mainly used to
advertise and collect information on financial matters); IRS REVENUE RULING 77-45, 1977-
1 C.B. 413 (exempting the U.S. office of a Canadian consulting engineering firm from
permanent establishment status because the Canadian employees at the office were not
authorized to make major decisions and their activities mainly involved planning and
supervision).
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the OECD similarly noted that servers are highly mobile. 141 Finally, as
noted above in the country review, tax authorities from England, Singapore,
Ireland, and Hong Kong have issued administrative pronouncements that
servers would never constitute permanent establishments under their
domestic tax laws.
There are a number of policy rationales that argue against using
servers as nexus for international income tax purposes. 142 First, a server is
simply a computer that has been networked to the Internet. There are
millions of servers around the world that could potentially act as a
permanent establishment: the new server/PE rule may be very difficult for
tax authorities to monitor or enforce. Second, because the OECD test
focuses on what the server does, the real test is actually placed on the
software functions within the computer server. But software, like any
information good, typically has high fixed costs of production but almost
zero costs associated with copying and distribution on a network-software
programs can be shifted to any server in the world and there may be no
connection between the location of the software program and the
jurisdiction where value is added or where the good or service is consumed
(both of which serve as theoretical foundations for the imposition of
international income taxes).
Third, in a related point, the server/PE rule provides opportunities
for international tax planning that could lead to base erosion in high tax
jurisdiction as servers or software functions within servers are transferred to
low or nil income tax jurisdictions. Fourth, the use of a server/PE is
arguably a significant departure from traditional international tax principles
because traditional permanent establishments-construction sites, stores,
factories-are fixed in a temporal and geographic sense and cannot be
moved without the incursion of significant costs by a firm. Fifth, it is
unclear how taxpayers or tax authorities will attribute profits to servers, if
any, potentially leading to international double taxation when tax authorities
cannot reach agreement on this issue. 
143
Taking into account the apparent initial apparent concerns about the
server/PE rule expressed by the Treasury Department and the OECD as
141 See OECD TURKU REPORT, supra note 7, at 97.
142 In previous works, I have argued that servers should never constitute permanent
establishments. See, e.g., Cockfield, supra note 1, at 186-191; Arthur J. Cockfield,
Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: A Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation,
85 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1177-1200 (2001).
143 In an environment of increased cross-border trade in intangible assets (including e-
commerce goods and services), the appropriate amount of profit that should be attributed to
a particular jurisdiction that created, transferred or sold the intangible asset is thought have
become a more important issue. The OECD has produced several draft papers in this area
to provoke discussion and consensus. See, e.g., OECD TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP ON
MONITORING THE APPLICATION OF EXISTING TREATY NORMS FOR THE TAXATION OF
BUSINESS PROFITS, ATTRIBUTION OF PROFIT TO A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT INVOLVED
IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS (Discussion Paper 2001).
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well as the policy concerns noted previously, how did this rule eventually
become enshrined within the OECD model tax treaty? As discussed within
their government reports, certain OECD member states were concerned
that, as net e-commerce importing nations, they would lose out on revenues
associated with the income taxation of international e-commerce because
foreign e-commerce businesses no longer needed to set up a traditional
physical presence within their borders. 144  Taxing servers located within
their jurisdictions seemed like one way to restore balance. 145 Other OECD
countries, such as Spain and Portugal, were requesting even more
aggressive changes to the model tax treaty, including an extension of the
permanent establishment definition to include commercial web sites in
some circumstances. 
146
At the time of the discussion, the United States produced the
majority of the world's e-commerce 147 and other OECD member states
were understandably concerned with the Treasury Department's apparent
support for residence-based rules for the taxation of e-commerce (under the
view that source base erosion would take place to the benefit of e-commerce
exporting nations). The support for a server/PE rule can be seen as a
reaction against residence-based taxation under the apparent (but likely
misguided) notion that taxing server profits would prevent or reduce base
erosion attributable to sales from foreign companies that were physically
144 See, e.g., Australian report, supra note 1, at 7.2.15 ("A web site located on a server,
that is fixed in time and location, and through which business is conducted may constitute a
[permanent establishment]."); Herb Dhaliwal, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND CANADA'S
TAX ADMINISTRATION, A RESPONSE BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE TO His
ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 21(1998) ("Whether a file
server fits the definition of a [permanent establishment] will depend on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. This issue will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis in
a manner that is consistent with the Department's current published interpretations and
rulings.").
145 The fact that servers should be taken into account for permanent establishment purposes
has been supported by at least a few commentators. See Luc Hinnekens, Looking for an
Appropriate Jurisdictional Framework for Source-State Taxation of International
Electronic Commerce in the Twenty-First Century, 26 INTERTAX 192 (1998) (proposing a
"virtual permanent establishment" rule that would take into account qualitative criteria
such as the presence of a server to determine whether the source country should be able to
assert jurisdiction as well as quantitative criteria such as sales volumes); BRIAN J. ARNOLD
& MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL TAX PRIMER 155-56 (2 nd ed., 2002) (noting that
the server/PE category would appear to be consistent with OECD precedents that recognize
automated pumping equipment as a permanent establishment, even without human
intervention).
146 See also Michael J. McIntyre, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Corporations in the Digital
Age, 55 BULL. INT'L FIs. Doc. 498 (2001) (arguing that the OECD should have permitted
websites to constitute permanent establishments as long as the "virtual office" is used to
perform the functions of a traditional office)
147 See OECD, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RESEARCH AGENDA 29 (1999) (estimating that the U.S. firms
accounted for 80% of total global e-commerce).
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located outside of the jurisdiction of consumption. As mentioned, the
Ottawa Taxation Framework guidelines included the desire "to achieve a
fair sharing of the tax base" and so the server/PE rule can be rationalized
under the view that the rule would maintain the current sharing of tax
revenues between residence and source countries. As discussed previously,
this view can no longer be supported because (a) there is no evidence of
significant source country base erosion; and (b) assuming that base erosion
took place, it would necessitate significant profit attribution to the
functioning of computer code, but the OECD seems to suggest in its e-
commerce profit attribution report that attribution should be limited in most
circumstances. 148
In order to move the process forward, the United States and other
governments ultimately agreed to the server/PE rule despite initial
opposition to the rule. 149 The U.S. may have preferred to work with its
OECD partners to develop a consensus view on the server/PE topic, as it
agreed to through the Ottawa Taxation Framework. Another possible
explanation is the view by the Treasury Department that few to no profits
would be attributable to servers hence the new rule would not dilute the
ability of the United States to tax profits generated by e-commerce exports,
returning the taxation of international e-commerce to the residence-based
system discussed within Treasury's 1996 discussion paper. As noted above,
this view may be incorrect to the extent that the server/PE rule provides tax
planning opportunities that permit firms to shift profits outside of relatively
high corporate income tax jurisdictions like the United States.
A danger exists that bad policy will result from the kind of herd
mentality that led to the adoption of the server/PE rule. 150 OECD member
countries may have backed the rule, in part, under the view that it was
needed to prevent the U.S., as the dominant producer of e-commerce goods
and services, from deriving a windfall benefit from the application of the
traditional permanent establishment rules to cross-border e-commerce
transactions. The point here is that the OECD's e-commerce reform
processes and ultimate international tax policy positions were shaped by
political concerns: political 'horse-trading' uninformed by a coherent policy
perspective creates a risk that 'bad' tax policy will result.
In addition, the arguably 'fuzziness' of the Ottawa Taxation
Framework guidelines, which included the desire for a "fair" sharing of
revenues may have influenced the development of the server/PE rule under
148 See note 143 supra.
149 See COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, CLARIFICATION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT DEFINITION IN E-COMMERCE: CHANGES TO THE
COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 5 14 (2001) (noting that, in order to reach consensus,
countries that initially opposed the view that no human intermediary was necessary for a
finding of a permanent establishment ultimately signed onto to the changes).
150 But see OECD Business Profits TAG Report, supra note 34, at 127-175 (providing
different national views to justify the server/PE category).
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the view that this rule would shore up source country taxation. As a result
of the lack of agreement on international tax policy principles noted below,
it may not be helpful to advocate fairness before the parties come to
agreement on what constitutes a fair share of the international tax base.
Having said that, the previous analysis shows that this Framework promoted
in other cases the development of widely-accepted and arguably sound tax
rules to govern international e-commerce.
B. INFORMAL VERSUS FORMAL WORLD TAX ORGANIZATIONS
This section builds on the analysis from the previous section by
situating the OECD's e-commerce tax reform process within the ongoing
debate on the need for a formal World Tax Organization that could impose
binding tax rules on participating nations to limit adverse outcomes caused
by, inter alia, international tax competition.
1. Lack of Agreement on Guiding Principles
Observers have noted that international tax policy analysis suffers
from a certain degree of arbitrariness because analysts and tax authorities
generally cannot come to agreement on the ways that accepted general
principles such as the need for inter-nation fairness should guide actual
reform efforts. 151  The problem in part is that a particular nation's
international tax interests may vary depending on its economic
circumstances. I1 2 For example, capital exporting nations tend to support
151 Dissatisfaction with traditional guiding principles such as the need for inter-nation
equity or enhanced global efficiency is often expressed within the literature. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated concepts
and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1357, 1362 (2001) (arguing that
policy analysts employ outdated concepts and inappropriate principles that do not permit
sound policy analysis); Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The
David R. Tillinghast Lecture "What's Source Got to Do With It?" Source Rules and U.S.
International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REv. 81, 83-84 (2002) (noting, "Because no clear
economic or equitable principles guide the formulation of rules to divide income and
expense by geographic origin, the construction of these rules has been a significantly
arbitrary exercise"); Richard M. Bird & J. Scott Wilkie, Source vs. residence-based
Taxation in the European Union: The Wrong Question, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 78, 84 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000)
(noting, "The existing 'system' of international income taxation is posited on a set of facts
that no longer holds, if indeed it ever did."). For a discussion on possible guiding
principles, see, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre, Guidelines for Taxing International Capital
Flows: The Legal Perspective, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 315 (1993); Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Commentary: Alternatives for International Corporate Tax Reform, 49 TAX L. REv. 599
(1994) (advocating greater resort to the non-discrimination principle).
112 For a discussion of the concept of intern-nation equity and economic allegiance theory,
see Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW &
POLICY INT'L Bus. 145 (1998).
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residence-based taxation under the principle of capital export neutrality,
which is achieved if a taxpayer's choice between investing at home or in a
foreign country is not affected by taxes.15 3 Capital importing nations tend
to support source-based taxation under the principle of capital import
neutrality, which maintains that companies operating abroad should be
placed in the same tax position as their local competitors. Many developing
nations and transitional economies prefer the rules within the United
Nations model tax treaty, which strengthen source-based taxation. 154 Other
nations may be both a capital exporting nation and a net e-commerce
importing nation, which complicates matters and may lead to different
preferred tax approaches for different industries.
This process can be distinguished from the different tax policy
positions adopted by states or provinces within federal countries: if
necessary, the highest court in the land can be resorted to provide one rule
for all taxpayers to clarify how tax laws will interact among the different
jurisdictions. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a bright-
line physical presence test in the context of U.S. state and local sales and
use taxation to ensure that inter-state commerce is not unduly inhibited by
overly aggressive state laws.155 Moreover, federal countries have legislative
bodies that can pass legislation that comports with widely-accepted tax
policy views (such as the passage by Congress of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, which reduced tax rates and broadened the income tax base, in
manner that was consistent with many policy perspectives).
Similarly, within tightly integrated economic regions such as the
European Union, the European Court of Justice plays an important (and
increasing) role in developing a unified tax policy for the European Union
countries. For example, in the 'Lankhorst-Hohorst' decision, the European
Court of Justice ruled that thin capitalization rules cannot impose unequal
treatment between resident and non-resident European Union companies,
leading many European Union countries to re-design these rules. 156 The
European Commission also plays an important role in shaping international
153 For views that support the design of international tax laws on the basis of capital import
export principles, see Robert J. Peroni, Commentary: Deferral of U.S. Tax on International
Income: End It, Don't Mend It Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?
79 TEX. L. REV. 1609 (2001); Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive
Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 981 (1997)
(advocating simplified rules to strengthen residence-based taxation).
154 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES art. 5(7) (New York, United Nations, 1980)
(extending source state taxation to the activities on independent agents in some
circumstances).
155 See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep.t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967); Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
156 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "AN INTERNAL MARKET WITHOUT COMPANY TAX
OBSTACLES: ACHIEVEMENTS, ONGOING INITIATIVES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES", COM
(2003) 726, at 6-8.
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tax policy for the European Union countries. For example, beginning in
2001 the European Commission announced that it would begin to
emphasize, as part of a longer term strategy, the 'consolidation' of corporate
income tax bases, while permitting the member countries to impose their
own tax rates. 157 Moreover, the Commission has achieved success in the
past with, for example, value-added tax (VAT) harmonization and unified
rules for the tax treatment of cross-border interest payments.
158
In contrast to the situation that exists for subfederal countries or for
highly integrated regional economic unions, there is no international court
or organization that has the authority to impose binding tax rules on
national governments. Without such an organization, there is no body to
encourage or mandate agreement on principles such as the need for inter-
nation equity in the sharing of the cross-border income tax base. The lack
of agreement on guiding principles would frustrate the ability of a global
tax institution to impose rules that would attract widespread acceptance by
national governments. This situation leads to a catch-22: the lack of
agreement serves as a barrier to the formation of a world tax authority and
the absence of a world tax authority frustrates the development of widely-
accepted guiding principles for policy purposes.
157 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "TOWARDS AN INTERNAL MARKET WITHOUT TAX
OBSTACLES", COM (2001) 582. Unlike full-blown harmonization, proposed corporate tax
consolidation schemes would co-exist with existing national tax regimes, thus preserving
tax sovereignty to a greater extent. For example, the Commission is studying whether
European Companies (European Union companies incorporated under the European
Company Statute that takes effect on January 1, 2005) that have adopted common
accounting standards can serve as the basis for developing a consolidated tax base. Other
companies that employ country-specific accounting standards would be subject to the
traditional tax rules under the different national tax systems. In 2003, the Commission
announced that its efforts would concentrate on studying the viability of a 'Home State
Taxation' system as well as the possibility of using harmonized accounting standards as the
basis for a consolidated tax base for companies with European Union-wide activities.
Under Home State Taxation, profits of a multinational firm would be computed according
to the rules of one tax system only: the system of the home state of the parent company or
head office of the firm. Each country would continue to tax its share of the firm's profits at
its own corporate tax rate. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AN INTERNAL MARKET WITHOUT
COMPANY TAX OBSTACLES: ACHIEVEMENTS, ONGOING INITIATIVES AND REMAINING
CHALLENGES, COM (2003) 726, at 8-11.
158 In 1993, the European Union countries harmonized their VAT tax bases and agreed to a
minimum VAT rate of 15%. The minimum rate legislation was amended in 2001. See
Council Directive 2001/4/EC of 19 January 2001 amending the sixth Directive
(77/388/EEC) on the common system of value added tax, with regard to the length of time
during which the minimum standard rate is to be applied (Official Journal of the European
Union, 2001). In order to inhibit tax evasion on portfolio interest payments, the
Commission passed a Directive whereby the member states agree to a transitional regime
where each country must either exchange information on interest payments or withhold tax
on these payments. See Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of
savings income in the form of interest payments, arts. 11 & 12 (L 157/38 Official Journal
of the European Union, 2003).
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2. Theoretical Uncertainty Surrounding the Value of Formal Global
Tax Organizations
Despite the inability to secure agreement on the application of
international tax principles, there have been calls for the development of an
international tax body other than the OECD. 159 An extensive literature has
debated the merits of an (upper case) World Tax Organization, which would
bind participating countries at the supranational level to inhibit perceived
problems such as harmful international income tax competition. 160  This
section provides an overview of some of the main points within this
literature, while the next section explores how the informal and flexible
nature of the OECD's tax reform process serves to better address
international tax policy concerns.
Arguments in favor of a World Tax Organization include the view
that: (1) it would restrict income tax competition that could lead to a 'race
159 A UN report recommended the development of a world tax organization. UNITED
NATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH- LEVEL PANEL ON FINANCING FOR
DEVELOPMENT (New York: United Nations, June 22, 2001). For discussion, see Frances
M. Homer, Do We Need an International Tax Organization?, 93 TAX NOTES 709 (2001).
See also VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 140 (1995) (suggesting that it
might be time to establish a world tax institution); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,
Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the State 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573, 1670-1674
(2000)(advocating enhanced global cooperation and coordination through an extension of
tax measures to the World Trade Organization); Victor Thuronyi, In Defense of
International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Tax Treaty, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 1291
(2001) (discussing the need for a global tax authority to administer a multilateral tax treaty
based on the OECD model). An extensive literature review in this area is beyond the scope
of this paper. For a recent treatment, see Adrian Sawyer, Is an International Tax
Organisation an Appropriate Forum for Administering Binding Rulings and APAs? 2
EJOURNAL OF TAX RESEARCH 8, 12 (2004) (arguing that global tax institutions are needed
to promote binding rules in certain areas such as transfer pricing disputes).
160 For a sample of a few sources in this area, see, e.g., Peggy B. Musgrave & Richard A.
Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and Competition in an International Setting, in INFLUENCE
OF TAX DIFFERENTIALS ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 61 (Proceedings of the
VIIth Munich Symposium on International Taxation, 1990) (asserting that international tax
competition will not secure an efficient allocation of resources among nations); Hans-
Werner Sinn, Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe, 34 EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW 489 (1990) (arguing that international tax competition will lead to a
greater focus of taxation on less mobile factors such as labour); Richard M. Bird & Jack M.
Mintz, Sharing the International Tax Base in a Changing World, in PUBLIC FINANCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NEW CENTURY 405 (S. Cnossen & H. Sinn eds., Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2003) (discussing barriers to international tax cooperation); John D. Wilson and
David Wildasin, 88:6 Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 1063 (2003) (reviewing the literature on tax competition and asserting that a
better understanding of political processes is necessary to promote more informed
modeling); ALEX EASSON, TAX INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 12-34 (2204)
(discussing the policy implications of the use of tax incentives to attract foreign direct
investment); and Robin Boadway, Income Tax Reform for a Globalized World: the Case
for a Dual Income Tax, 16 J. ASIAN ECON. 910 (2005).
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to the bottom' as nations compete for mobile capital by reducing their
corporate income tax burdens, possibly leading to revenue shortfalls and the
inability to fund needed government programs; (2) as countries reduce
income tax burdens on capital, they tend to increase burdens on less mobile
factors of production such as labor leading to regressive tax policy; (3)
binding international tax rules might inhibit tax evasion or aggressive tax
arbitrage strategies that deplete national revenues; (4) uniform income tax
rules among nations could potentially lower compliance costs for
multinational firms as they would have expend fewer resources to deal with
different national tax laws (this is the motivation behind the EU
Commission's base consolidation proposals touched on previously); and (5)
binding international agreements would inhibit countries from creating
special tax incentives to attract mobile resources, which is thought to reduce
international capital productivity as firms allocate resources to countries for
tax reasons and not out of any real economic rationales.
Arguments against a formal World Tax Organization along with
possible harmonization of tax bases and/or rates include the view that: (1)
competition tames the so-called Leviathan tendencies of government to
fund inefficient public services; (2) maintaining different income tax
regimes promotes policy experimentation and innovation that could lead to
future efficiency gains; (3) different income tax regimes can better address
the distinct needs of different economies that, for instance, may prefer to
subsidize certain business activities deemed crucial for national economic
success; (4) centralized global institutions can be bureaucratic and could
impose tax solutions that would create burdensome compliance costs for
firms with cross-border activities; and (5) a World Tax Organization would
unduly inhibit national sovereignty (this last item is taken up in the next
section).
An 'all or nothing' approach identified above clearly oversimplifies
the array of policy options provided to tax authorities. In fact, there exist
more nuanced options that can be placed along a spectrum from the least tax
sovereignty comprimising to the most, including: (a) no cooperation
whatsoever; (b) bilateral coordination via tax treaties; (c) multilateral
informal cooperation and coordination (e.g., via the OECD model tax
treaty); (d) multilateral coordination with limited binding rules such as
binding arbitration for transfer pricing purposes; (e) more formal
multilateral cooperation such as global formulary apportionment where
participants would need to agree on a binding formula with specified factors
to divvy up the international income tax pie; (f) multilateral agreement to
harmonize national rates and/or bases; (g) formal World Tax Organization
with authority to issue binding rules to participating nations after
multilateral negotiations take place; and (h) a World Tax Organization with
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legislative, executive and judicial branch for governance over international
tax matters. 
161
The OECD's e-commerce tax reform efforts fall within the spectrum
under paragraphs (b) and (c) by encouraging multilateral cooperation on tax
solutions that are ultimately reflected in the OECD model tax treaty, which
filters down into bilateral tax treaty negotiation and coordination. These
reform processes take an intermediate position by permitting OECD nations
to maintain a high degree of flexibility with their tax policies (hence
preserving sovereignty) while agreeing to adopt coordination measures into
their treaty network to ensure a consistent application of tax rules on cross-
border transactions.
3. The OECD as informal 'world tax organization'
While there remains an ongoing debate surrounding the need for
binding global tax institutions, observers generally note that movement in
this direction remains unlikely for the foreseeable future. 162 Most nations
continue to view their tax systems as an important component in pursuing
socio-economic policies and wish to maintain laws and policies tailored to
their national interest without interference from a formal World Tax
Organization or other overly intrusive binding measures: tax sovereignty
concerns remain one of the prime drivers of international tax policy.
63
Viewed through the lens of international relations theory, the development
161 See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade
Zone, 49 TAX L. REV. 708 (1994) (discussing the need for comprehensive tax linkages
among North American governments to reduce compliance costs and promote an efficient
allocation of cross-border resources); Tim Edgar, Corporate Income Tax Coordination as a
Response to International Tax Competition and International Tax Arbitrage, 51 CND. TAX
J. 1097 (2003) (arguing that limited coordination rather than harmonization is the preferred
alternative to inhibit harmful cross-border arbitrage activities).
162 See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New
Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 45 (2003)
(noting that comprehensive international tax reform efforts "would require a degree of
international tax cooperation that may charitably be described as implausible"); Richard M.
Bird, Shaping a New International Order, BULL. INT'L Fisc. DOc. 292, 297 (1988)
(characterizing the desire for a world tax system as "utopian" and unrealistic); OECD,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS para. 3.66 (Paris: OECD, looseleaf) (rejecting global formulary
apportionment as a transfer pricing methodology because it "would require a level of
international cooperation that is unrealistic to expect in the field of international
taxation."); H. David Rosenbloom, Sovereignty and the Regulation of International
Business in the Tax Area, 20 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 267 (1994) (discussing sovereignty
constraints on international tax policy).
163 For discussion on the ways that tax sovereignty concerns drive international policy
positions, see Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Integration under NAFTA: Resolving the Conflict
between Economic and Sovereignty Interests, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 (1998) (arguing that
incremental approaches that address sovereignty concerns promote sound policy).
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of international tax policy can be understood as an ongoing political process
designed to accommodate the needs of important economic actors (e.g.,
multinational firms) by reducing tax barriers to cross-border trade and
investment while, at the same time, meeting and respecting the political
needs of nation states. 164 A better understanding of the political processes
that shape international tax laws could lead to more informed policy
analysis. 165
From this perspective, the OECD appears to be a good fit as it
accommodates the interests of the most advanced industrial economies and
their taxpayers without imposing any rules that would bind the tax policy of
its member countries. The lack of authority to enact binding rules does not
necessarily mean that the OECD is "toothless" as can be seen by returning
to the vexing dilemma of international tax competition.
Since 1997, the OECD has taken the international lead in
disentangling "fair" tax competition from "harmful" competition. 166 OECD
member states have agreed to reduce their own "harmful preferential tax
regimes" in the context of mobile financial and other services. For
example, the OECD asserted that the use of foreign sales corporation
provisions in the United States constituted a harmful tax practice. 167 In
164 See, e.g, Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between
Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT'L
L. 79 (1998) (employing international relations theory to promote understanding of
international tax cooperation mechanisms); Bird & Wilkie, supra note 151, at 96 (arguing
that what matters most is not whether a proposed solution accords with a presumed
normative principle, but whether the solution is likely to be accepted by major players in
the international tax game).
165 For discussion, see Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL. STUD. 61
(2002) (discussing the political realities that deter tax harmonization efforts and concluding
that these realities "are often ignored" ); ARTHUR J. COCKFIELD, NAFTA TAX LAW AND
POLICY: RESOLVING THE CLASH BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, at 145-
159 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) (examining the trade-offs between
political and economic concerns to discern an appropriate international policy approach for
the NAFTA countries).
166 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998). The
ongoing OECD study aims to: identify the effects of tax competition; examine criteria for
distinguishing between fair and harmful competition; and recommend ways in which
governments acting individually or collectively could ameliorate negative tax competition
effects. Id. at 8. The member states of the European Union have also agreed, through a
non-binding political commitment, to eliminate tax measures that promote harmful tax
competition. See Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997
concerning taxation policy in OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, C2,
January 6, 1998 (98/C 2/01) (discussing factors that determine whether taxation measures
are "harmful").
167 See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND
ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 14 (2000). These tax provisions subsidized
foreign exports and were also found to be an illegal trade subsidy by a World Trade
Organization panel. WTO, UNITED STATES TAX TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN SALES
CORPORATIONS, WT/DS I08/AB/R (Feb. 2000).
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addition, OECD members have agreed that they may retaliate against
uncooperative tax havens who have not agreed to eliminate their harmful
tax practices by December 31, 2005.168
According to the OECD, by 2004 only two of the forty-seven
harmful tax regimes maintained by OECD members remained.
169
Moreover, thirty-three tax havens had agreed to reform their tax laws to
enhance information exchange and encourage transparency: only five
countries remained on the list of uncooperative tax havens. 170 While its
ultimate outcome remains uncertain, the OECD's harmful tax competition
project can be portrayed as another significant step forward in international
tax cooperation as it encourages multilateral coordination efforts to combat
the use of tax havens to avoid or evade income taxes and limited tax base
harmonization among OECD member states (by prohibiting the use of
certain tax measures).
The potential success of the OECD's harmful tax competition
project shows that global tax institutions may be able to address policy
challenges without the need to resort to binding agreements or the
traditional "sticks" of international law (such as threatened trade
retaliation). 171  Similarly, the success of the OECD e-commerce reform
168 Taxpayers sometimes use tax havens to legally defer or illegally evade income tax
liabilities, resulting in revenue losses to the high tax jurisdictions like the United States.
These losses may be increasing. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Latest
IRS Data Show Jump in Tax Haven Profits, TAX NOTES 151 (2004) (discussing a 64%
increase in profits allocated to low tax jurisdictions by U.S.-based multinational firms from
1998 to 2000).
169 See OECD 2004 Progress Report, supra note 167, at 12.
170 Id. at para. 27.
171 Id. at para. 34 (concluding that "Substantial progress has been made in advancing the
goals of the harmful tax practices project and many of the objectives originally set for this
project have been accomplished"). But see Alex Easson, Harmful Tax Competition: An
Evaluation of the OECD Initiative, 34 TAX NOTES INT'L 1037 (2004) (criticizing aspects of
the project and noting areas where information exchange will not reduce abusive tax
avoidance and evasion schemes); U.S. Foundation Lambastes OECD Global Forum on
Taxation, 2005 WTD 221-9 (2005) (noting that OECD member states themselves often
refuse to adopt the transparency and information exchange requirements they wish to
impose on tax havens); Robert Goulder, New Coalition Strikes Back at OECD Tax Haven
Campaign, 89 TAX NOTES 1352, 1352 53 (2000) (describing opposition to the OECD
harmful tax competition project on the grounds that the project is too intrusive on the
sovereignty of many developing countries and that it will unduly impede the movement of
capital across borders). It is important to note that, as mentioned, the OECD harmful tax
competition project contemplated retaliation against uncooperative tax havens, which is
arguably more in line with traditional international law measures that seek to encourage
compliance with legal rules through the use of "sticks." While this paper has taken the
position that the OECD mainly preserves the ability of countries to pursue their own tax
destinies, others maintain that OECD's international tax reform efforts in fact intrude to an
unacceptable extent on tax sovereignty. See, e.g., Daniel Mitchell, The Paris-based
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Pushing Anti-U.S. Policies
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process, where it arguably acted for the first time as a (lower case) world
tax organization, serves as evidence that heightened multilateral cooperation
and coordination through informal institutions can provide opportunities for
the development of widely-accepted tax policy and rules.
C. THE ROAD AHEAD: THE NEED FOR MORE FORMAL OUTREACH
The fact that the OECD currently only needs to develop consensus
for its thirty member states likely helps to find tax solutions. For the most
part, these OECD members control the bulk of the world's capital, and have
similar interests as mature industrialized nations with service and
technology-oriented economies. The ability to reach consensus on reform
options is likely assisted by the fact that the OECD is constituted by only
thirty countries so that reform does not become bogged down in a process
where broader multilateral interests come into play. The OECD members
include all of the most advanced economies of the world, and many have
similar national interests so that they are, in the OECD's own words, "like-
minded," 172 which facilitates the attainment of consensus.
But the fact that the OECD generally remains a "rich countries'
club" is also a drawback for the development of effective international
reform. 173 Countries such as India have viewed the OECD reform efforts
with suspicion because of the understandable perspective that the
organization is designed to protect the interests of its member countries. For
example, the OECD model tax treaty eliminates withholding taxes on
royalties, which supports the interests of net technology exporting
countries. 174 By merely tinkering with the permanent establishment concept
through the new server/PE rule, for instance, Indian tax authorities have
argued that the OECD is protecting the interests of capital exporting nations
at the expense of the interests of capital importing nations. Disagreements
between OECD member countries and non-member countries are to be
avoided as they reduce tax certainty and increase the risk of international
with American Tax Dollars, 6 PROSPERITAS 1 (Center for Freedom and Prosperity
Foundation, 2006).
172 OECD, CHAIR OF THE HEADS OF DELEGATION OECD WORKING GROUPS, A STRATEGY
FOR ENLARGEMENT AND OUTREACH 16-17 (2004) ["OECD Outreach Report"] (indicating
that "like-mindedness" includes shared values concerning market-based economies and
democratic principles).
173 On the need to enlist non-OECD member input to promote effective international tax
reform, see Bentley, supra note 121, at 1133-34. For discussion on the need to take better
account of developing nations' interests, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax
Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000); Li,
supra note 3, at 586 (arguing that inter-nation fairness should be paramount when different
policy proposals are considered); Charles E. McClure, Jr., Will the OECD Initiative on
Harmful Tax Competition Help Developing and Transition Countries? 59 Bulletin for
International Fiscal Documentation 90 (2005).
174 See OECD model tax treaty, supra note 6, at art. 12.
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double taxation, which in turns inhibits international trade and investment
(and harms the interests of OECD countries and their multinational firms).
One obvious way to create more inclusive reform efforts is to extend
OECD membership to more countries. Mexico, for example, historically
refused to enter into any tax treaties with developed nations but changed its
policy and entered into its first treaty based largely on the OECD model
with Canada in 1992 after Mexico was considered and later granted OECD
membership in 1994 (the burgeoning Mexican tax treaty network was also
influenced by Mexico's decision to enter NAFTA and the World Trade
Organization). 175 It is unlikely, however, that the OECD will significantly
increase membership in the near future, although the organization is
considering membership extension to certain countries. 176 In any event,
many countries may not wish to become an OECD member if it they are
forced to change tax policy (such as the extension of tax holidays to non-
resident firms) or other aspects of domestic policy (such as privacy or
criminal laws) in accordance with the OECD mandate to encourage
democracy, the rule of law, and individual human rights.
177
In fact, in recent years the OECD has taken several significant steps
to take into consideration the views from non-member countries. In 1997,
the OECD began to add the positions of certain non-member countries to
the OECD model tax treaty "in recognition of [the] growing influence of the
Model Convention in non-member countries."' 178  In 2002, the OECD,
International Monetary Fund, and World Bank announced efforts to form
the International Tax Dialogue to provide a forum for input from
developing countries and other international organizations on tax measures
to improve co-ordination of technical assistance, share good practices and
pursue common objectives in improving the administration of national tax
systems. 1
79
In addition, the OECD has sponsored multilateral tax centers in
Austria, Hungary, Turkey, Mexico and Korea to hold meetings with
representatives from non-OECD countries. I18 Moreover, the OECD
175 See Income Tax Convention, Apr. 8, 1991, Canada-Mexico (amended by a Protocol on
same date).
176 For discussion, see OECD Outreach Report, supra note 172, at 6 (describing mandate to
investigate OECD enlargement and outreach).
177 On the other hand, an increasing number of developing nations might benefit from
inclusion within the OECD if membership encourages more transparent statistics
concerning economic indices by tapping into highly respected OECD statistical gathering
resources. Greater transparency could encourage more inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) into these developing nations as investors would be presented with more certain
information concerning the economic status of the country where their FDI takes place.
178 See OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 10 (Condensed Version, 2003).
179 For discussion, see Bentley, supra note 121, at 1133; Homer, supra note 160, at 712.
180 See Charles Gnaedinger, OECD Tax Centers Spark Dialogue for Non-OECD States'
Benefit, 2004 WTD 86-7 (2004).
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operates tax centers in Russia, China, Malaysia and India and assists with
the development of regional programs in Latin America and Africa. 18' The
OECD also provides a Global Forum on tax matters whereby non-member
countries are provided some opportunities for input and design of tax
reform options. 182  Finally, as discussed, the OECD developed outreach
programs for its e-commerce tax reform efforts (such as membership in
TAGs) to ensure that non-member states participated in the dialogue that
led to changes within the OECD model tax treaty.
A more effective solution may be to combine and formalize the
different outreach programs developed by the OECD. 1 3 The e-commerce
example demonstrates that outreach heightens the chance for effective
reform when non-member countries can participate in the deliberation and
formulation of changes to international tax rules and principles. The formal
structure could be designed in such a way to extend permanent membership
to non-member countries to provide opportunities for them to voice their
concerns and assist with the design of reform efforts. By creating a
permanent structure, the OECD reform efforts could promote legitimacy
with these non-members, further encouraging them to 'buy-in' to reform
efforts.
Two-tiered membership could be extended to participating
countries. The first tier would include all OECD member countries-
consensus among these members would continue to be needed to enact
major policy changes, such as amendments to the OECD model tax treaty.
The second tier would include non-member countries who wished to be
granted permanent membership within this tier. Countries from both tiers
would be invited to deliberate policy changes through the Committee on
Fiscal Affairs and its committees, but only tier one countries could
ultimately make these changes (this approach is similar to the OECD's e-
commerce tax reform efforts).
Tier two status would be likely problematic for non-member
countries but, given current political realities, it may be the best that they
can hope for. 184  Permanent membership at least would provide non-
181 id.
182 See OECD Outreach Report, supra note 172, at 31-36.
183 See, e.g., OECD Outreach Report, supra note 172, at 35 (noting the development of
more formal memberships in the context of the Global Forum on Competition).
184 This proposal could be used to promote the reform advocated by Frances Horner who
asserts that, for any international tax cooperation efforts to be successful with respect to
taking into consideration the needs of developing countries, an agenda with the following
five elements is required: (a) an open dialogue on all reform issues, including replacing
fundamental principles of international tax such as the non-taxation of portfolio income; (b)
dialogue on sharing revenues from profits, including analysis of global formulary
apportionment; (c) taking into consideration how developed countries' tax systems may
inhibit development for developing countries; (d) increasing emphasis on training and
providing other resources to support developing countries' efforts to improve tax
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member countries with more opportunities to access OECD resources and
to provide input. It would also help to allay concerns that the OECD has
been 'captured' by multinational firms based in OECD countries; the
perceived influence of these firms may be reducing the legitimacy and
effectiveness of OECD reform efforts.
The proposal would not change the status quo by any significant
degree and hence might attract the necessary support from OECD members.
The OECD's outreach program has already been formalized to a certain
extent through the Board for Co-operation with Non-OECD Economies (a
subsidiary body of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs) and the Advisory
Group on Co-operation with Non-OECD Economies, which administers the
outreach programs and advises the Board. 185 In addition, the Committee on
Fiscal Affairs already permits certain non-OECD member countries to
participate in committee work as Observers. In 2004, China and South
Africa joined Russia and Argentina as Observers in the CFA: this seems to
be a positive step in that it would be consistent with the view, noted earlier,
that the OECD is effective at informally accommodating the changing
global economic environment. The OECD could further legitimize its
reform efforts and become a truly global tax organization by extending
permanent membership to non-member countries to give them more
opportunities to provide input into prospective reform efforts.
CONCLUSION
This Article reviewed national and OECD reactions to the
challenges presented by the taxation of international e-commerce. The
OECD took a lead role at promoting guiding principles to tackle these
challenges then developed consensus-promoting processes to move the
reform efforts forward. The success of these efforts likely pre-empted
national legislative and administrative actions as governments, as revealed
by the survey within this paper, were generally content to abide by the
OECD views.
As evidenced by the e-commerce reform initiatives which involved
unprecedented global tax cooperation, the OECD is increasingly acting as
an informal (lower case) world tax organization in contrast to the sometimes
touted need for a formal (upper case) World Tax Organization that could
impose binding tax rules on participating nations. In a world where
governments jealously protect their tax sovereignty, the OECD reform
process, which emphasizes multilateral deliberation and consensus-building
administration; and (e) ensuring that developing countries can provide input into reform
efforts. See Homer, supra note 160, at 714-715.
185 See CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, HANDBOOK: DEVELOPING
PARTNERSHIPS WITH NON-OECD ECONOMIES 4, 10 (2004) (describing three categories of
partnerships, which extend cooperative efforts to non-OECD member states).
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through "soft institutions," may be the best available option for the
development of international tax policy that promotes international welfare
while permitting nations to continue to pass tax laws in their perceived
national self-interest. The OECD could further legitimize its reform efforts
by creating a formal and simplified outreach program to provide a more
inclusive forum for deliberation between OECD member and non-member
states.
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